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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, additional crimes, increased punishments, and novel 
applications of the criminal justice system enter U.S. jurisprudence,1 
sometimes coming in a predictable frenzy analogous to other recurring 
events in American society, such as the bacchanalia of New Year’s Eve or 
the annual “madness” surrounding the months of March (for college 
basketball fans) and April (for procrastinating taxpayers).  Any expansion 
may appear gradual—another crime here and an enhanced sentence there—
                                                          
* Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law. Many thanks to Ellen 
Podgor and Paul Rosenzweig for organizing the “Overcriminalization:  The Politics of 
Crime” symposium and to the members of American University Law Review for hosting the 
event.  Thanks also to Troy Booher, Daniel Medwed, Manuel Utset, and work-in-progress 
participants at the University of Utah for their insightful comments. 
1. See, e.g., Michael Gardner, New Year Brings a Lot of State Laws, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 1, 2005, at A1 (reviewing new California laws); Ryan Keith, New Laws 
Include Minimum Wage Hike, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at 6 (detailing new Illinois 
laws); A New Year, a Slew of New Laws, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 1, 2005, at 12 
(describing new laws nationwide); Robert Tanner, Diverse Laws Ring in the New Year, 
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 31, 2004, at A9 (listing new laws across nation); Amy F. Bailey, New 
Laws Help Get the Lead Out, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 22, 2004, at B7 (reporting on new 
Michigan laws).  See generally Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, 25 CATO POL’Y 
RPT. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Luna, Overextending], available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v25n6/luna.pdf (Feb. 14, 2005) (“Nothing is certain, 
Ben Franklin once said, but death and taxes.  Had he lived during our time, Franklin might 
have added a few other certainties—and almost assuredly among them would have been the 
concept of ‘crime.’”).  
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and the latest criminal provision or practice may seem trivial in effect.  
Over time, however, the United States has experienced a dramatic 
enlargement in governmental authority and the breadth of law enforcement 
prerogatives.  Consider the following motley assortment: 
• Delaware punishes by up to six months imprisonment the sale of 
perfume or lotion as a beverage.2  In Alabama, it is a felony to maim 
one’s self to “excite sympathy” or to train a bear to wrestle, while 
Nevada criminalizes the disturbance of a congregation at worship by 
“engaging in any boisterous or noisy amusement.”3 Tennessee makes it 
a misdemeanor to hunt wildlife from an aircraft,4 Indiana bans the 
coloring of birds and rabbits,5 Massachusetts punishes those who 
frighten pigeons from their nests,6 and Texas declares it a felony to use 
live animals as lures in dog racing.7  In turn, spitting in public spaces is 
a misdemeanor in Virginia,8 and anonymously sending an indecent or 
“suggestive” message in South Carolina is punishable by up to three 
years imprisonment.9  Not to be outdone, the federal government 
prohibits placing an advertisement on the U.S. flag (or vice versa) 
within the District of Columbia, as well as the unauthorized use of the 
“Red Cross” emblem or the characters “Smokey Bear” and “Woodsy 
Owl.”10  Moreover, innumerable local ordinances carry the possibility 
of criminal consequences, such as the jailable offense of failing to 
return library books in my hometown of Salt Lake City.11 
                                                          
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 901(6) (2001). 
3. NEV. REV. STAT. 201.270(2) (2003). 
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-109(a) (2004). 
5. IND. CODE § 15-2.1-21-13 (1998). 
 6. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 132 (2002). 
 7. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(7)-(8) (Vernon 2003); see also id. § 42.09(i) 
(Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (making offense a third degree felony if accused has violated the 
same provision twice before). 
 8. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-322 (Michie 2004). 
 9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-250 (Law. Co-op. 2003). 
 10.  4 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (U.S. Flag); 18 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (Red Cross); 18 U.S.C. § 
711 (1988) (Smokey Bear); 18 U.S.C. § 711a (1988) (Woodsy Owl). 
 11. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE chs. 11.36.100, 1.12.050 (2005), available at 
http://www.slcgov.com/government/code/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).  The list of oddball 
offenses is nearly endless, and “[s]ome crimes barely pass the laugh test.” Luna, 
Overextending, supra note 1, at 1. 
New Mexico makes it a misdemeanor to claim that a product contains honey unless 
it is made of “pure honey produced by honeybees.” Florida criminalizes the display 
of deformed animals and the peddling of untested sparklers, as well as the 
mutilation of the Confederate flag for “crass or commercial purposes.” Pretending 
to be a member of the clergy is a misdemeanor in Alabama, and Kentucky bans the 
use of reptiles during religious services. Maine prohibits the catching of 
crustaceans with anything but “conventional lobster traps,” Colorado makes it a 
misdemeanor to hunt wildlife from an aircraft, and Texas declares it a felony to trip 
a horse or “seriously overwork” an animal. In turn, California forbids “three card 
monte” and, as a general rule, cheating at card games, while it’s a crime in Illinois 
to camp on the side of a public highway or offer a movie for rent without clearly 
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• Nearly every American jurisdiction continues to add new offenses and 
enhanced punishments for certain “vices” involving voluntary 
transactions for desired goods and services (e.g., drugs and sex).12  
While many penal codes prohibit behaviors related to vice activity,13 
some jurisdictions have gone even further by criminalizing, for 
example, the distribution of devices used for sexual stimulation.14  And 
after Congress passed legislation that expanded the ban on maintaining 
property for drug activity,15 lawmakers contemplated a pair of bills that 
would punish those who hold an “entertainment event” where drugs 
might be consumed.16  Worse yet, the federal government apparently 
recognizes few limits in its enforcement of drug laws, as demonstrated 
                                                          
displaying its rating. Add to those gems countless local offenses, such as playing 
frisbee on Galveston beaches after being warned by a lifeguard, molesting monarch 
butterflies in Pacific Grove, California, failing to return library books in Salt Lake 
City, or annoying birds in the parks of Honolulu. 
Id. at 1, 15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 877.16 (2001) (banning display of deformed animal); 
FLA. STAT. ch. 791.013 (2001) (prohibiting sale of untested sparklers); FLA. STAT. ch. 
256.10 (2001) (proscribing words or acts that “cast contempt upon the flags of the 
Confederacy”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6432 (West Supp. 2004) (criminalizing 
catching lobsters with anything but “conventional lobster traps”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-6-
124(2) (2003) (banning wildlife hunting from aircraft); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 42.09(a)(8),(10) (Vernon 2003) (prohibiting the tripping of horses and seriously 
overworking of animals); CAL. PENAL CODE § 332(a)-(b) (West 1999) (criminalizing certain 
card games and dishonesty); 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-124 (2002) (prohibiting camping on 
the side of public highways); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 395/3, 395/4 (2002) (requiring official 
rating to be displayed on all videos for rent).  See also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 515-16 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, 
Pathological Politics] (listing strange laws). 
 12. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 
528-33 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Principled Enforcement] (providing examples of vice 
crimes); see also Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 572-76 (discussing 
criminalization of vice). 
 13. This would include banning the possession of drug paraphernalia and making it a 
crime to loiter for drug or sex transactions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 893.145-.147 (2001) 
(declaring a broad range of items as paraphernalia when used to make or ingest drugs); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (Michie 1997) (establishing factors that constitute loitering). 
 14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2004) (prohibiting the exchange of 
“any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the 
stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value”), upheld by Williams 
v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that 
prohibition was unconstitutional). 
 15. See Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 608(b)-(c), 
117 Stat. 650, 691 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 856 (Supp. 2004)) (adding “lease, rent, 
[and] use” to the types of proscribed activities). 
 16. See Clean, Learn, Educate, Abolish, Neutralize, and Undermine Production 
(CLEAN-UP) of Methamphetamines Act, H.R. 834, 108th Cong. § 305 (2003) (extending 
criminal liability to promoters of any “rave, dance, music, or other entertainment event” 
where the promoter knew or should have known that controlled substances would be used or 
distributed); Ecstasy Awareness Act of 2003, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (proposing 
a similar offense for “rave[s] or similar electronic dance[s]” applicable to anyone who gains 
monetarily from an event). See generally Jacob Sullum, Editorial, When Holding a Party is 
a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A27 (arguing against such legislation). 
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by the prosecution of medicinal marijuana providers17 and the 
exploitation of the anti-terrorism USA Patriot Act to investigate 
suspected drug offenders.18 
• Countless petty offenses, civil infractions, and traffic ordinances are 
handled by law enforcement in the same fashion as serious offenses or 
are bootstrapped into quasi-crimes through legal fictions.  Juveniles 
are not only liable for violations of the relevant penal code, but also for 
a variety of “status offenses” involving behaviors that are perfectly 
legal for adults—staying out late, smoking or chewing tobacco, 
drinking alcohol, having sexual relations, failing to attend class, and so 
on.19  What is more, police have been used to enforce a school’s 
internal rules of conduct, with children arrested for, inter alia, 
violating the student dress code.20  Although juvenile justice systems 
are premised on the paternalistic goals of the state and the allegedly 
“civil” nature of the proceedings, the resulting penalty may be no 
different from standard criminal punishment:  involuntary 
confinement.21  Equally important, the harm done to a child—
including emotional and physical abuse at the hands of fellow 
delinquents and even state officials in juvenile detention centers—does 
not depend on whether the predicate offense is one of violence or of 
status.22   
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, A California Cultivator of Medical Marijuana is 
Convicted on Federal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at A14 (discussing the trial of Ed 
Rosenthal, who was convicted on federal drug cultivation and conspiracy charges despite 
growing marijuana pursuant to California’s medical marijuana law).  But see United States 
v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (reducing Rosenthal’s sentence). 
 18. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes From Drugs to 
Swindling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1 (noting the Justice Department’s use of new 
powers in non-terrorism cases). 
 19. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION 123-58 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing status offenses). 
 20. See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2004, at A1 (describing arrests of students in Toledo, Ohio school system, as well as 
additional arrests for turning out bathroom lights and throwing a tantrum while in “time-
out”). 
 21. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Care of Juvenile Offenders in Mississippi is 
Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2003, at A13 (detailing abuses in Mississippi’s state-run 
facilities for juvenile delinquents). 
 22. See id. (reporting rampant physical abuse of children in such facilities).  At one 
time, federal law effectively prohibited the imprisonment of status offenders.  See Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223(a)(12), 88 Stat. 1109, 
1121 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) 
(conditioning state receipt of certain federal grant money on removal of juvenile status 
offenders from detention centers).  However, Congress soon created a loophole to this ban, 
allowing for the detention of juvenile status offenders who violate any court order.  Juvenile 
Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509, § 11(a)(13), 94 Stat. 2750, 2759 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2000)).  See also Halbfinger, supra note 21, at A13 
(remarking that seventy-five percent of girls at a Mississippi training school were status 
offenders or probation violators). 
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• But minors are not the only ones treated like criminals for seemingly 
non-criminal behavior; individuals have been arrested for eating food 
and talking loudly on a cell phone near Metro stations in Washington, 
D.C.,23 for instance, and low-level offenses such as loitering and 
violating subway rules have resulted in abusive strip-searches in New 
York City.24  The U.S. Supreme Court has even put its imprimatur on 
full-fledged arrests for, respectively, refusal to identify one’s self25 and 
failure to wear a seatbelt.26  In addition, law enforcement agents 
around the nation continue to use the local vehicle code and other low-
level violations as pretexts to rummage around for unrelated offenses, 
most notably, to search motorists and pedestrians for drugs and guns.27 
• Over the past century, the federal government has slowly but surely 
secured a general police power to enact virtually any crime.  Among 
other things, Congress has adopted repetitive and overlapping statutes, 
extended criminal liability to behavior that is already well-covered by 
state laws and local enforcement, and created newfangled but mostly 
superfluous offenses like “carjacking”28 that deal with conduct 
addressed by existing provisions such as robbery and kidnapping.29  
                                                          
 23. See Lyndsey Layton, Bitter Taste of Metro Arrest Lingers, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 
2004, at B1, B3 (detailing arrests on the District of Columbia’s Metro system for finishing a 
candy bar and talking loudly on a cell phone). 
 24. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Suit Accuses Police in Brooklyn of Strip-Searches in 
Minor Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a federal lawsuit alleging that 
police officers at Central Booking in Brooklyn routinely strip-searched misdemeanor 
arrestees, often in front of other detainees). 
 25. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (upholding 
suspect’s arrest for failing to provide his name to an officer pursuant to Nevada’s “stop and 
identify” law). 
 26. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (affirming arrest and 
detention for non-jailable offense of failing to wear a seat belt). 
 27. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that an officer’s 
subjective intent and ubiquity of traffic violations are legally irrelevant to Fourth 
Amendment inquiries so long as there was probable cause to believe that any law had been 
broken); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The 
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545-57 
(1997) (criticizing Whren as legitimizing the stop of any American driver and arguing that 
police predominantly use this discretion against minority groups); WILLIAM BRATTON, 
TURNAROUND:  HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 213-14, 227-29 
(1998) (discussing New York City’s crime reduction strategy of arresting low-level 
offenders, often in an attempt to search for or extract information about additional crimes); 
Bernard H. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing 
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (critiquing the “broken windows” theory and 
New York City’s  order-maintenance policing). 
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (imposing federal criminal liability on those who take 
motor vehicles by force, violence, or intimidation and “with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily harm”). 
 29. Compare id. (defining carjacking), with Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 284, 286, 
591 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2004) (detailing Virginia’s common law definition of robbery, which 
prohibits the taking of any property of another by violence or intimidation), and MODEL 
PENAL CODE §§ 222.1, 223.2 (1985) (defining robbery as inflicting or threatening to inflict 
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National lawmakers have also dispensed with traditional constraints on 
culpability when ostensibly acting on behalf of the public welfare.30  
The U.S. Supreme Court has long acquiesced to federal crimes that 
lack a mens rea requirement and instead impose liability in the absence 
of a guilty mental state (i.e., “strict liability”),31 and contemporary 
regulations often reject the historic limitations on vicarious criminal 
responsibility for the acts of others.32   
• The impact of this jurisprudential transformation has been exacerbated 
by the rise of the modern administrative state, erecting a vast legal 
labyrinth buttressed by criminal penalties in areas ranging from 
environmental protection and securities regulation to product and 
workplace safety.  Many public welfare offenses, such as submitting 
an incorrect report33 or serving in a managerial role when an employee 
violates agency regulations, expose otherwise law-abiding people to 
criminal sanctions.  For example, a construction supervisor was 
sentenced to six months imprisonment under the Clean Water Act 
when one of his employees accidentally ruptured an oil pipeline with a 
backhoe,34 and a Michigan landowner was recently convicted under the 
                                                          
serious bodily harm on another during the taking of another’s property), and Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 443, 448, 592 S.E.2d 400, 402 (2004) (“[C]arjacking is a 
species of robbery.”). 
 30. Of course, state penal codes have also incorporated the concept of strict liability. 
See, e.g., People v. Dillard, 201 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding a conviction 
for carrying a loaded firearm in a public place and deeming irrelevant defendant’s lack of 
knowledge that the weapon was loaded). 
 31. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 663-64, 670-73 (1975) (observing that the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not require conscious wrongdoing and 
affirming conviction of a chief executive officer for unsanitary food storage conditions); 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81, 285 (1943) (holding a corporate 
president criminally liable under same law without proof of a culpable mental state because 
he stood in “responsible relation” to the corporation’s distribution of mislabeled 
pharmaceuticals); see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (refusing to 
read into a statute the common law requirement of a culpable mental state when legislative 
intent indicates that the statute’s purpose was to allocate risk to a certain class of actors). 
 32. See Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, 
7 HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEM. 1, 3-12 (2003) (discussing elimination of mens rea 
requirements and limitations on vicarious liability). Vicarious liability might be seen as 
connected to or as a subset of strict liability, although one authority rejects the notion that 
one necessarily flows from the other.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 268-69, 269 n.22 
(3d ed. 2000) (“There is no basis for assuming that vicarious liability necessarily follows 
from strict liability,” nor “for the assumption that vicarious liability can never be imposed 
for crimes requiring mental fault by the employee.”) 
 33. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2000) (criminalizing the making of a false 
statement in any document required to be filed or maintained under the Clean Water Act); 
United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
violation of the Clean Water Act does not require knowledge of relevant provisions or 
illegality of conduct). 
 34. See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120-22 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
conviction of a supervisor under the Clean Water Act when a backhoe operator ruptured a 
pipeline because, inter alia, legislation was enacted for the public welfare); see also United 
States v. Hanousek, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103-04 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
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same statute for moving sand onto his property without a federal 
permit.35 
• In addition, the federal government has assumed unlimited authority to 
prosecute various forms of deception, with criminal statutes stretched 
to embrace garden-variety dishonesty, promise-breaking, and breaches 
of fiduciary duty.36  In one case, a union leader was convicted of false 
statements for simply replying “no” when asked by federal 
investigators whether he had accepted a bribe,37 while in another case a 
university professor was found guilty of mail fraud for granting 
degrees to students who had plagiarized their work.38  Moreover, 
federal fraud statutes and laws such as the Travel Act39 allow 
prosecutors to take a legal violation in another jurisdiction and literally 
“make a federal crime out of it.”40  Not only have minor, infrequently 
                                                          
certiorari) (contending that the Clean Water Act’s criminal penalties and regulation of 
ordinary activity prevent it from being described as public welfare legislation); Rosenzweig, 
supra note 32, at 1-2, 4, 8, 10, 13-14 (describing and criticizing Hanousek). 
 35. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632-33, 640-44 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming defendant’s conviction under the Clean Water Act due to classification of his 
property as federally protected “wetlands”); see also Felicity Barringer, Michigan 
Landowner Who Filled Wetlands Faces Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A20 
(describing Rapanos case and discussing prosecutions under the Clean Water Act); 
Editorial, Wetlands Desperado, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2004, at A12 (criticizing Rapanos 
case and disproportionate punishment). See generally James V. DeLong, The New 
“Criminal” Classes:  Legal Sanctions and Business Mangers, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL:  THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING 9 (Gene Healy ed., 2004) [hereinafter GO 
DIRECTLY TO JAIL] (noting that the Department of Justice had convicted 740 individuals and 
collected $297 million in criminal penalties under federal environmental law by 1995); 
Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles:  Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill of 
Rights, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra, at 45 (critiquing criminal prosecutions under federal 
environmental laws). 
 36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2000) (criminalizing false statements made 
pursuant to “any matter” within any branch of the federal government); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2000) (proscribing various fraudulent transactions utilizing the Postal Service or private 
interstate mail carriers); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (prohibiting similar fraudulent transactions 
over interstate wire, radio, and television signals); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (defining 
“scheme or artifice to defraud” under § 1341 and § 1343 as including a plan to “deprive 
another of the intangible right to honest services”). See also Jeffrey Standen, An Economic 
Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1998) 
(citing over three hundred federal proscriptions against fraud and misrepresentation). 
 37. See United States v. Brogan, 522 U.S. 398, 399-406 (1998) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making a false statement regarding his receipt of 
bribes); see also Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 551-52 (discussing 
Brogan’s interpretation of the federal false statements statute as an example of broad 
criminal liability used by prosecutors as leverage in negotiating guilty pleas). 
 38. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 363-70 (6th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that 
defendant professors deprived the institution of its intangible right to honest services); see 
also Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 517 n.55 (offering Frost as an example 
of overextended mail fraud liability). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). 
 40. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (criticizing tendency “to take 
whatever the latest issue was in the newspaper that day” and make it a federal offense in 
order to get “a great press release back home that allowed members of Congress to show 
LUNA 10/3/2005  1:34 PM 
710 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:703 
applied state laws been pursued as federal felonies,41 but defendants 
have also been convicted in U.S. District Court for violating the laws 
of foreign nations.42 
• Both federal and state governments have contributed over the past 
quarter century to a punishment binge of unprecedented size and 
scope.  Although the downfall of the “rehabilitative ideal”43 and the 
rise of determinate sentencing were supposed to herald an age of 
fairness and proportionality, the upshot has been a massive increase in 
punishment irrespective of theoretical justification or practical 
experience.  Anti-recidivist statutes and “mandatory minimums” have 
been particularly popular, imposing stiff punishment regardless of all 
other considerations.44  Some of the most notorious examples involve 
low-level drug offenders and other minor criminals sentenced to years 
or even decades in federal prison.45  In one recent case, a young man 
                                                          
just how tough they are on crime”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1090-1103 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding, inter alia, a federal felony indictment for violation of Utah’s commercial 
bribery statute, a misdemeanor under state law). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(affirming a defendant’s federal conviction for violating Canadian tax law through the use 
of interstate wires), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004).  See also United States v. McNab, 
331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding federal conviction for violation of Honduran 
fishing regulations), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004); Ellen Podgor & Paul Rosenzweig, 
Editorial, Bum Lobster Rap, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A14 (criticizing the McNab 
prosecution and noting that the Honduran government believed that its laws had not been 
violated and had filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the McNab defendants). 
 43. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:  PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 1-31 (1981) (discussing the rehabilitative model of penology, which 
viewed the goal of criminal sanctions as changing the convicted offender’s character). 
 44. California’s “Three Strikes” scheme may be the most infamous anti-recidivist law, 
with defendants receiving sentences of twenty-five years to life for, among other things, 
stealing a slice of pizza. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) 
(requiring an indeterminate life sentence, with a mandatory minimum of at least twenty-five 
years, where the defendant has been convicted of any felony and has two or more prior 
serious or violent felony convictions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c) (West Supp. 2005) 
(same); Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes’ Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (2004) 
(noting “extreme cases resulting in 25-years-to-life terms of imprisonment—cases involving 
petty third strikes like the theft of a bicycle or piece of pizza”); see also Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11, 28-31 (2003) (upholding twenty-five years to life sentence for the offense of 
stealing three golf clubs valued at twelve hundred dollars); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 
(2003) (affirming two consecutive twenty-five years to life sentences for two thefts of 
videotapes). See generally Vitiello, supra, at 4-17 (contending that the expense of 
California’s Three Strikes law far outweighs any benefits it provides); Anthony Kline, 
Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1087-94 (1995) 
(discussing Three Strikes law’s troublesome consequences for the judiciary).  
 45. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines:  A Critique of Federal Sentencing, 458 
CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 17-19 (2002) [hereinafter Luna, Misguided Guidelines] (providing 
examples of lengthy mandatory sentences for drug offenses); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) 
(2000) (establishing levels of mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses).  But 
cf. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the federal sentencing 
guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment insofar as they require judges to increase 
punishment above the maximum allowable sentence based on the jury verdict alone). 
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convicted of selling marijuana on three occasions while carrying (but 
not brandishing) a firearm received a fifty-five year sentence even 
though the trial court described the punishment as “unjust, cruel, and 
even irrational.”46 
At first blush, these laws, cases, and anecdotes appear to lack a common 
thread that runs throughout, something that would justify their shared 
categorization.  As will be suggested below, however, the key unifying 
theme is the government’s ready misuse of crime and punishment as 
concepts and the criminal justice system as an institution.  Every 
augmentation provides officials a new legal instrument to apply against 
members of the so-called “criminal class” (many of whom look remarkably 
similar to the class of “normal” folks).  Whether any given instance might 
be seen as abusive, of course, depends on an individual’s personal 
predispositions and intellectual commitments, whatever they may be.  But 
in general, “American criminal law’s historical development has borne no 
relation to any plausible normative theory,” William Stuntz suggests, 
“unless ‘more’ counts as a normative theory.”47  Instead, the above 
examples and others like them would be deemed unjustifiable under a 
number of philosophical traditions as inappropriate manipulations of the 
criminal sanction and the legal system.  Each is a case in point of what I 
will term overcriminalization, a socio-political phenomenon that might be 
evaluated in the aggregate for causes, consequences, and correctives.  In 
particular, Part I will offer an account of overcriminalization, while Part II 
will consider why the phenomenon occurs and what are the ensuing costs. 
Part III will briefly mention the various solutions tendered to date as well 
as their limitations.  It will then examine a particular strand of moral 
philosophy—libertarianism—as a potential theoretical structure to confront 
                                                          
 46. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004); see also 
Angie Welling, 55-year Term Assailed; Utah Judge Reluctantly Hands the Mandatory 
Sentence to Offender, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 2004, at B1 (describing outrage 
over sentence and noting that twenty-nine former federal judges and prosecutors joined in 
Angelos’ argument that his punishment was unconstitutional).  Ironically, defendant 
Angelos might have received another 78-97 months imprisonment prior to the Supreme 
Court’s Booker decision. See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1260-61 (holding Guidelines 
unconstitutional as applied to defendant). Ironfisted mandatory minimum sentences have 
emerged outside of the drug enforcement context as well, with, for instance, a defendant 
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for possession of a single bullet with neither a 
firearm nor nefarious motives.  See United States v. Yirkovsky, 259 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 
2001) (reasoning that although a sentence of fifteen years for possessing a single bullet “is 
an extreme penalty under the facts as presented to this court,” “our hands are tied in this 
matter by the mandatory minimum sentence which Congress established”); see also United 
States v. Yirkovsky, 276 F.3d 384, 385 (8th Cir. 2001) (Arnold, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (suggesting “that on its face the sentence is grossly disproportionate to 
the offense for which it was imposed”); Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 45, at 19 
(detailing Yirkovsky’s case and noting that prosecutors used the threat of a lengthy sentence 
to attempt to extract information about other crimes). 
 47. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 508. 
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the phenomenon.  Finally, Part IV will describe the theory’s import for 
issues of criminal justice and present an application of the libertarian 
premise to a pending congressional bill. 
I. DEFINING THE PHENOMENON 
To be clear, the criminalization phenomenon has been the topic of legal 
scholarship for years.  Renowned figures of criminal justice like Sanford 
Kadish and Herbert Packer have addressed the uniquely American 
penchant for crime and punishment,48 with additional scrutiny provided by 
contemporary scholars such as John Coffee, William Stuntz, and many 
others.49  Yet for all the ink spilled, the phenomenon persists to this day. A 
recent report concluded that the erratic body of federal law has now 
swelled to more than four thousand offenses that carry criminal 
punishment,50 and other works have noted similar upsurges in the number 
of crimes at the state level.51  As suggested by the previous examples, 
however, overcriminalization is not merely a problem of too many crimes 
akin to an opera having “too many notes.”52  Instead, it encompasses a 
broad array of issues, including:  what should be denominated as a crime 
                                                          
 48. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 250-366 (1969); 
Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of 
Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967). See also 
NORVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN’S GUIDE TO CRIME 
CONTROL (1970) (addressing political misuse of the criminal justice system). 
 49. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Reflections]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!:  The Criminal State of 
Confidential Information after McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of 
Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost:  
The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 
YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) [hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms Lost]; Stuntz, Pathological Politics, 
supra note 11; William J. Stuntz, Reply:  Criminal Law’s Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828 
(2002); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line]. See also John S. Baker, Jr., 
State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 674 
(1999) (“Throughout the twentieth century, particularly since 1970, federal law has further 
encroached on the domain of state and local crime.”); Ellen S. Podgor, Do We Need a 
“Beanie Baby” Fraud Statute?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1031 (2000) (critiquing the 
contemporary trend of enacting statutes to cover every new instance of fraud). 
 50. John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. (2004), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second 
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170-73 (2003) (describing 
and criticizing expansion of criminal codes); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 
515 (“[A]nyone who studies contemporary state or federal criminal codes is likely to be 
struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of conduct they render punishable.”). 
 52. In the 1984 Academy Award-winning movie Amadeus, Emperor Joseph II 
complained that Mozart’s opera had “simply too many notes.”  “Just cut a few,” the 
Emperor suggested, “and it will be perfect.”  AMADEUS (Warner Bros. 1984). 
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and when it should be enforced; who falls within the law’s strictures or, 
conversely, avoids liability altogether; and what should be the boundaries 
of punishment and the proper sentence in specific cases. 
The treatment of these seemingly disparate state actions as a single, 
comprehensive phenomenon requires explanation, and for me, at least, an 
adequate rationale stems from the very nature of criminal law and the 
attendant power of enforcement.  When society designates as “crime” 
particular acts accompanied by a sufficient degree of subjective awareness 
or intent, it makes a critical moral judgment about the wrongfulness of such 
conduct, the resulting harm caused or threatened to others, and the 
culpability of the perpetrators.53  And when society punishes an individual 
for having committed a crime, the magnitude of the sentence represents a 
concomitant decision about the degree of wrongfulness, harmfulness, and 
culpability, all in service of the legitimate goals of punishment—namely, to 
prevent future criminality and/or to justly punish individuals for past 
misconduct.54  Each of the assumptions underlying the denomination of 
crime and the determination of punishment can be deemed necessary but 
insufficient criterion to invoke the full power of the criminal justice system.  
Having the common cold may be potentially harmful in some sense—after 
all, who wants to catch another person’s illness?—but it seems ridiculous 
to claim that the “perpetrator” harbors the degree of responsibility and his 
“conduct” evinces the type of wrongdoing necessary to justify labeling him 
a criminal subject to punishment.55 
Instead, the criminal sanction should be reserved for specific behaviors 
and mental states that are so wrongful and harmful to their direct victims or 
the general public as to justify the official condemnation and denial of 
freedom that flow from a guilty verdict. In fact, these consequences for the 
individual distinguish criminal justice from all other areas of law.  The state 
                                                          
 53. In his excellent discussion of the moral content of criminal law, Stuart Green 
defines these three essential concepts as follows: 
[T]he term “culpability” refers to the moral value attributed to a defendant’s state 
of mind during the commission of a crime . . . . Culpability reflects the degree to 
which an individual offender is blameworthy or responsible or can be held 
accountable . . . . Social harmfulness reflects the degree to which a criminal act 
causes, or risks causing, harm.  “Harm” is normally defined as an intrusion into a 
person’s interest . . . . Moral wrongfulness involves conduct that violates a moral 
norm or standard.  Like social harmfulness, it refers to the moral content of a 
defendant’s criminal act, rather than to the moral status of the actor.  Killing, 
raping, and stealing all are morally wrongful acts. 
Stuart Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:  Overcriminalization and the 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1547-51 (1997) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 54. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 207-27 [hereinafter Luna, Punishment Theory] 
(discussing traditional punishment theories). 
 55. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one day in prison 
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
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authority to deprive freedom or even life itself—the most potent action any 
government can take against the governed—is sui generis.  The process of 
civil justice redistributes wealth to compensate individuals for injuries of 
tort and contract, none of which is pleasant for the civil defendant.  But it 
almost goes without saying that incarceration (or death, of course) is 
different in kind, rather than degree, from monetary dispossession,56 
involving an incomparable denial of human dignity and autonomy.  The 
practical consequences of involuntary confinement (e.g., prison rape57) 
only accentuate the distinction between acts and mental states identified as 
crime and those regarded as tort or contractual breach.  Moreover, the 
stigma associated with the brand of “criminal” cannot be equated to the 
relatively mild designation of “tortfeasor” or “contract-breaker.”58  Not 
only are convicted offenders viewed as outcasts subject to social scorn, but 
they are also deprived of the rights and benefits accorded to others, 
including the opportunity for political participation and gainful 
employment.59  Given the moral gravity of decision-making in criminal 
justice and the unparalleled consequences that flow from such 
determinations, criminal liability and punishment must always be 
justifiable in inception and application.60 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 772-73 
(2004) (“The most important difference between the criminal law and other bodies of law, 
or systems of social control that are not modes of law at all, is that the former subjects 
offenders to punishment.”); Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 49, at 24-25 (“Criminal 
punishment often means prison, and prison is both different from and worse than money 
damages.”).  As demonstrated by modern juvenile justice systems, however, de facto 
criminal adjudication may be disguised as a civil proceeding.  “[J]uvenile proceedings to 
determine ‘delinquency,’ which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be 
regarded as “criminal,’” the U.S. Supreme Court declared nearly four-decades ago. “To hold 
otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the ‘civil’ 
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.” In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967). Cf. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997) (formulating 
a test to determine whether a proceeding is criminal or civil); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment 
and Procedure:  Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 775 (1997) (discussing the difficult distinction between criminal and civil proceedings 
in determining what constitutes “punishment”). 
 57. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate’s Suit Offers View Into Sexual Slavery in 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1 (reporting on the brutal realities of prison rape); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (detailing personal 
accounts of inmate rape based on information from more than three hundred prisoners in 
thirty-four states). 
 58. Cf. SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT:  ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
51 (1987) (arguing that crime involves a type of moral disapproval that does not necessarily 
attach to violations of the economic order); Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional 
Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 546-48 (2004) (suggesting that 
punishment is designed to degrade an offender’s social dignity). 
 59. Symposium, Beyond the Sentence:  Post-Incarceration Legal, Social, and Economic 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491 (2003). 
 60. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW xix (1978) (“[Criminal 
law’s] central question is justifying the use of the state’s coercive power against free and 
autonomous persons.”); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE 
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Overcriminalization, then, is the abuse of the supreme force of a criminal 
justice system—the implementation of crimes or imposition of sentences 
without justification.  The phenomenon would certainly include far-fetched 
offenses like catching lobsters with something other than a “conventional” 
trap.61  Such crimes seem so deficient in harmful wrongdoing and beyond 
any legitimate rationale for state action as to flunk what I have previously 
described as the “laugh test.”62  It would also cover the full range of vice 
crimes and related offenses that continue to vex libertarians due to the 
absence of a cognizable violation of individual rights.63  The same can be 
said for various economic offenses (e.g., criminal violations of certain 
antitrust laws) that are not merely extensions of the common law crime of 
larceny (e.g., embezzlement) but instead more “closely resemble[] 
acceptable aggressive business behavior” largely committed by 
“respectable people in the respectable pursuit of profit.”64 
In addition, overcriminalization may be seen in various legal devices that 
can expand criminal liability to individuals who hardly seem blameworthy, 
including strict liability offenses that dispense with culpable mental 
states,65 vicarious liability for the acts of others without some evidence of 
personal advertence or even neglect,66 and doctrines like conspiracy and its 
federal cousin, RICO,67 that allow punishment for verbal collusion coupled 
with some scintilla of objective action.  The phenomenon also comes in the 
form of grossly disproportionate penalties that bear no relation to the 
wrongfulness of the underlying crime, the harmfulness of its commission, 
or the blameworthiness of the criminal—such as a multiyear prison term 
for possessing a single bullet without a firearm or corrupt motive68—
                                                          
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1-27 (1968) (discussing the importance and principles of justification 
for punishment); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 335, 371-72 (2000) (asserting that “the liberty interest of citizens creates a 
presumption against the use of the criminal sanction, and that therefore criminal prohibitions 
stand in need of justification”); Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, supra note 56, at 773 
(arguing that the enactment of crime and imposition of punishment must always be 
justified); Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 155-56 (1995) (similar). 
 61. See supra note 11 (citing Maine’s prohibition on catching lobsters with anything but 
“conventional lobster traps”). 
 62. See id.; Luna, Overextending, supra note 1, at 1. 
 63. See, e.g., supra note 143-56 (discussing libertarian understanding of individual 
rights); Luna, Overextending, supra note 1, at 15 (mentioning acts of prostitution, the 
possession, sale, or use of illegal drugs, and gambling as examples of vice). 
 64. KADISH, supra note 58, at 42, 50. 
 65. Luna, Overextending, supra note 1, at 15. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 
84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000)) (establishing 
criminal liability for members of organizations that engage in “racketeering activity”). 
 68. See supra note 46 (discussing the Yirkovsky case). 
LUNA 10/3/2005  1:34 PM 
716 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:703 
producing sentences that cannot contribute to the traditional goals of 
punishment in any meaningful sense. 
The problem of overcriminalization may extend beyond the text of a 
given law as well, implicating the dubious application of the powers vested 
in lawmakers or enforcers.  Superfluous offenses would fit within this 
group—duplicative penal code sections that simply retread the same 
conduct over and over again, for example, or new, allegedly necessary 
statutes (e.g., “carjacking”) that prohibit behavior already sufficiently 
addressed by existing law.69  It would also include criminal provisions that 
go beyond the limited authority of a given jurisdiction, as demonstrated by 
the countless federal offenses that have only spurious connections to the 
constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress.70  Likewise, this 
understanding of overcriminalization would incorporate abusive policing, 
such as state agents deploying the full weight of their authority to search 
and arrest based on trifling offenses or even civil infractions, which results 
in an overbearing and overreaching style of law enforcement worthy of the 
term “despotism.”71 
In sum, this definition of the overcriminalization phenomenon consists 
of:  (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that 
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) 
grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual 
enforcement of petty violations.  If this were a treatise, it would now be 
appropriate to provide a detailed discussion of why each of these categories 
and representative examples should be considered abuses of government 
authority. For instance, time might be spent analyzing the constitutional 
text and original understanding of federal jurisdiction on issues of criminal 
justice, discussing how Congress has the authority to criminalize truly 
national concerns connected to explicit provisions in America’s charter, 
such as treason and counterfeiting, but lacks a general police power to 
enact the type of comprehensive penal code found in the states.  Specific 
federal offenses might then be examined, explaining why Congress 
exceeded its jurisdiction by criminalizing, for example, violations of boxer 
safety.72  Likewise, pages could be filled discussing how a voluntary 
transaction for illicit drugs and ingestion of the same is no more wrongful 
                                                          
 69. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing carjacking). 
 70. See infra notes 164, 177-78 and accompanying text (detailing constitutional limits 
on congressional power). 
 71. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 539 (suggesting that if crime is 
defined broadly enough, law enforcement officers have discretion to arrest “whomever they 
wish”). 
 72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6308-6309 (2000) (providing for fines or imprisonment for 
violations of the Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2000), including 
provisions that require physician certification of boxers, renewal of boxer identification 
cards, and the reporting of boxer injuries to the appropriate registry). 
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than drinking a bottle of wine (or so the argument goes) and that no injury 
accrues to others so long as the consumer does not get behind the wheel.  
And, in fact, these types of arguments will be made below with regard to a 
bill currently pending in Congress.73  But a relatively large body of 
scholarship, which I will simply adopt by reference,74 challenges 
governmental power or prudence in each of the above categories and with 
regard to many of the particular instances of crime, punishment, or 
enforcement without justification. 
It must be admitted, however, that my list is neither exhaustive nor 
universally adopted in academe; others may focus on harebrained offenses 
and redundant statutes, for example, while placing liability-expanding 
doctrines under a different heading.75  Moreover, some of the categories 
and illustrations appear susceptible to a binary conclusion—the crime of 
prostitution is either justifiable or it is not—while other categories involve 
judgments of degree, such as the point at which punishment for a particular 
crime becomes excessive.76  But one of the major deficiencies in existing 
analysis is the failure to see overcriminalization precisely for what it is:  a 
broad phenomenon encompassing a multiplicity of concerns but always 
involving the unjustifiable use of the criminal justice system.  By viewing 
the issues in isolation—the passage of silly crimes or the misapplication of 
vicarious liability or the imposition of disproportionate punishment, and so 
on—the bigger picture becomes lost, how government abuses its immense 
power in each situation as part of an alarming readiness to apply the 
criminal justice system without limitation throughout the entirety of 
American life.77  And while some of the above categories and examples 
seem amenable to a thumbs-up/thumbs-down assessment while others raise 
                                                          
 73. See infra notes 180-188 and accompanying text (discussing the Sensenbrenner Bill). 
 74. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. L., AM. BAR ASSOC., 
REPORT ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998) (analyzing and criticizing 
Congress’ federalization of crime and punishment); STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, 
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR:  RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993) 
(critiquing drug criminalization); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992) 
(questioning the legitimacy of state authority to punish adult drug users); Symposium, 
Federalism and the Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 757 (1996) (examining the 
relationship between federal and state criminal law enforcement); Symposium, 
Federalization of Crime:  The Roles of the Federal and State Governments in the Criminal 
Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1995) (discussing the federalization of crime, as well 
as the increasing discretionary role of federal prosecutors and the politicization of crime and 
its damaging impact on state courts). 
 75. See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 512-19 (focusing on, inter 
alia, trend toward more crimes, repetitive provisions, and exotic offenses). 
 76. Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985-86 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J.) (rejecting constitutional principle limiting prison sentences because of, 
inter alia, inadequate standards for when punishment has become disproportionate). 
 77. In Professor Kadish’s words, “it is fair to say that until these problems of 
overcriminalization are systematically examined and effectively dealt with, some of the 
most besetting problems of criminal-law administration are bound to continue.” KADISH, 
supra note 58, at 21. 
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questions of gradation, this does not mean that the latter should not qualify 
as overcriminalization.  As with all matters of amount, there can be a large 
middle ground of dispute and yet substantial agreement at each end of a 
rational continuum.  Although we can debate whether a year in prison for 
petty theft is justifiable, a life sentence for stealing a piece of pizza seems 
beyond the pale.78 
II. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
If this understanding is accepted, questions remain as to why the 
overcriminalization phenomenon occurs and what are the resulting costs.  
Any number of accounts can be offered for America’s propensity to use 
and abuse the criminal sanction, but let me offer some of the more 
plausible explanations.  To begin with, the escalation of “law and order” 
politics in recent years has created a one-way ratchet in U.S. governance, 
churning out an ever-increasing number of crimes and severity of 
punishments.79  As a rule, lawmakers have a strong incentive to add new 
offenses and enhanced penalties, which offer ready-made publicity stunts, 
but face no countervailing political pressure to scale back the criminal 
justice system.80 Conventional wisdom suggests that appearing tough on 
crime wins elections regardless of the underlying justification, if only to 
provide another line on the résumé or potential propaganda for a 
grandstanding candidate, while it is difficult to recall a single modern 
politician who came into office on a platform of decriminalization or 
punishment reduction.81  As any competent political strategist knows, fear 
of crime can drive voters to the polls, and just as importantly, the potential 
benefits to powerful interest groups can fill campaign coffers.82  By 
                                                          
 78. Supra note 44 (discussing Three Strikes cases). 
 79. See, e.g., supra notes 43-46 (describing America’s punishment binge). 
 80. See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 51, at 169-73 (discussing the degradation of 
American criminal codes that occurs through the continuous stream of additions and 
amendments by legislators, particularly in response to interest-group lobbying and public 
outcry to high-profile cases).  Professors Robinson and Cahill note that as a result of the 
“deluge of legislation,” Illinois’s criminal code is now twelve times longer than when it was 
originally enacted in 1961.  Id. at 172. 
 81. But see Bulwa Demian, Harris Defeats Hallinan After Bitter Campaign, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 10, 2003, at A1 (noting that Terrence Hallinan, San Francisco’s District 
Attorney until 2003, won consecutive victories in the 1990s despite touting one of the 
country’s most progressive approaches to prosecution that included opposing the death 
penalty and supporting rehabilitative diversion programs and the legalization of marijuana). 
 82. For instance, after the horrific murder of twelve-year-old Polly Klaas by a recidivist 
with an extensive rap-sheet, the public’s fear of violent crime seemed to offer California 
state officials no other option but to support the then-stalled Three Strikes bill. See Erik 
Luna, Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1998) (describing the 
social and political environment that paved the way for Three Strikes). One California state 
senator confessed, “I don’t think we have any choice [but to pass the Three Strikes law],” 
while another senator candidly admitted, “I’m going to vote for these turkeys because 
constituents want me to.” Id. at 5 n.37. Moreover, one group with a professional and 
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contrast, individuals and organizations who oppose further augmentation of 
the penal code, including members of the criminal defense bar and civil 
liberties groups, can usually be ignored at virtually no political cost to those 
seeking elected office. And once codified, criminal provisions may be 
effectively unrepealable.83 
Politicians have also become nimble in deploying the rhetoric of 
accepted justifications for state action in support of the otherwise 
unjustifiable.  Lawmakers have claimed that the enactment of particular 
offenses and increased punishments will reduce crime through deterrence 
and incapacitation without supplying corroborating evidence, for example, 
or that such legislation will dole out what offenders “deserve” despite the 
weight of retributive arguments to the contrary.84  Moreover, political 
demagogues can skillfully assert that whatever conduct is at issue produces 
the type of “harm” necessary for criminalization, when, in fact, the relevant 
behavior fails to infringe on any significant right or interest of others.85  
“Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has 
become meaningless,” suggests Bernard Harcourt, as “the harm principle 
no longer serves the function of a critical principle because non-trivial 
harm arguments permeate the debate.”86  Oftentimes, however, the real 
issue is one of symbolic or expressive politics, with groups seeking public 
recognition of the righteousness of their worldviews through the 
criminalization of behavior associated with their perceived enemies.87  
                                                          
financial interest in incarcerating more criminals for longer periods of time—California’s 
prison guard union—poured money into the campaign for the anti-recidivist statute. See 
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 436 n.242 (1997) (noting that the California Correctional Peace Officers 
Association (CCPOA) donated the second-highest amount in support of the Three Strikes 
bill); Fox Butterfield, Political Gains By Prison Guards, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at A1 
(“[The CCPOA] has transformed itself into the most politically influential union in the 
state . . . to push not only for better benefits for its members but also for ever more prisons 
and tougher sentencing laws.”). 
 83. An interesting example is the continued existence of hoary anti-dueling statutes. 
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, §§ 3-4 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.171-.173 
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.410 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 661-62 (West 
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-12-1, 11-12-4 (2002). 
 84. See Luna, Punishment Theory, supra note 54, at 250-58 (discussing the abuse of 
punishment theory for political purposes). Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of 
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 414, 417 (1999) (suggesting that politicians make deterrence 
arguments “to minimize opposition to their preferred policy outcomes”). 
 85. For instance, the mere existence of pornography supposedly “harms” women, or so 
it is argued.  See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 140-47 (1999) (discussing claims of “harm” in support of anti-
pornography laws). 
 86. Id. at 113. 
 87. See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:  STATUS POLITICS AND THE 
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the symbolic politics 
underlying alcohol prohibition); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD (1984) (analyzing symbolic politics in the abortion debate); Erik Luna, The 
.22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 63-91 (2002) (considering symbolic 
LUNA 10/3/2005  1:34 PM 
720 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:703 
Politicians figuratively “smash”88 the face of the opposition by enacting 
crimes and punishments that express contempt for an alternative lifestyle, 
regardless of the harmfulness of the underlying act or culpability of the 
relevant actor.89 
The collapse of the harm principle, to use Professor Harcourt’s phrasing, 
can also be seen in the covert power of legal moralism and the modification 
of political dialogue on vice crimes.  Religious notions of good and evil 
provided the original grounds for criminalizing behavior such as drug and 
alcohol use, gambling, prostitution, and a variety of consensual, non-
commercial sexual activities.90  For legal moralists, there could be no 
divide between crime and sin:  “[T]he law must base itself on Christian 
morals and to the limit of its ability enforce them,” argued English jurist 
Lord Patrick Devlin, or “the law will fail.”91  Since the end of the Victorian 
age and its conception of virtue, many traditional vice crimes have become 
extinct, including the repeal of alcohol Prohibition in 1933 and, more 
recently, statutory and constitutional reforms on issues of sex.92  To a 
certain extent, legal moralism has been “properly killed off” and “the 
forces of superstition and oppression” repelled.93 Various vice crimes 
remain to this day, however, while some offenses, such as those involving 
drugs, continue to swell in breadth and intensity.  But any political 
reaffirmation or legislative expansion is not necessarily due to explicitly 
                                                          
politics in contentious issues such as gun control). 
 88. GUSFIELD, supra note 87, at 184-85. 
 89. As an aside, I was dismayed to discover that an amicus curiae brief in Lawrence v. 
Texas had cited and quoted my scholarship in support of the proposition that anti-sodomy 
statutes could be justified by their expressive content.  Brief of Amici Curiae American 
Family Association et al. at 12-13, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).  
The implication was patently false—the relevant article had described the various functions 
of law, including its use for symbolic or expressive purposes, without arguing that such 
functions were justifiable.  Moreover, the brief failed to mention my express disclaimer 
within the article: 
Let me reiterate, as to be clear on what is being said and, more importantly, what is 
not being said . . . .  [T]he fact that law can serve a symbolic function apart from 
behavioral modification and has the power to delineate between socially acceptable 
conduct and repulsive nonconformity does not mean that it should be used in such a 
manner. 
Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 12, at 545.  Apparently (and thankfully), the brief 
had no effect on the Supreme Court’s decision.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (striking down an anti-sodomy statute). 
 90. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 391, 407-11 (1963) (exploring the religious roots of morals legislation, such 
as bans on homosexuality, adultery, gambling, intoxication, etc.). 
 91. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 25 (1965). 
 92. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing Prohibition); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 
(finding that an anti-sodomy law violated the Due Process Clause); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (striking down a statute banning the use of 
contraception by married persons as violating right to privacy). 
 93. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 74-75 
(1995). 
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moralistic arguments.94  Instead, officials tend to rely on claims of harm in 
contemporary public debates—suggesting, for instance, that vulnerable 
people and society at large are “harmed” when someone, somewhere 
smokes marijuana or snorts cocaine.95 
Ironically, immorality in the philosophical sense (as compared to 
immorality from a purely religious or personal perspective) is no longer 
viewed by government as a prerequisite to invoke the criminal sanction.96  
In other words, behaviors need not be wrongful and harmful in any 
meaningful way and individuals need not be culpable before new crimes 
are enacted and their offenders punished.  Rather, a legislator only has to 
point to some alleged need or hardship, no matter how minor or 
implausible, in order to rally his fellow lawmakers behind an otherwise 
unjustifiable penal statute.  In the past few decades, easily exploited tropes 
like “corporate greed” have offered bumper sticker-style expressions that 
make even the most fanatical and foolish proposals impossible to stop.  
What is more, the margin between crime and tort has gradually 
disappeared, with behavior that only demanded financial compensation in 
the past now serving as grounds for imprisonment.97  The end result has 
been the proliferation of an entire body of morally neutral criminal law, as 
Professor Kadish has described it,98 including certain business and 
regulatory offenses that lack harmful wrongdoing as well as the doctrines 
of vicarious and strict liability, which dispense with individual culpability 
altogether.  With these crimes and related principles, the only real source of 
legitimacy is their ratification by a democratic entity, while the only 
inducement for compliance is the generalized belief that laws should be 
obeyed backed by the threat of criminal enforcement.  But even this slender 
justificatory foundation is undermined when the true basis for enactment 
and enforcement is unrelated to the ostensible rationale for the law, as 
when questionable crimes are used to search for other offenses or to 
squeeze money from the alleged criminal with an eye toward padding 
government budgets.99 
                                                          
 94. See Harcourt, supra note 85, at 139 (arguing that the harm principle has replaced 
the “1960s rhetoric of legal moralism”). 
 95. See id. at 172-76 (addressing the conflict between the early progressive arguments 
that drug use constituted “victimless crimes” and policies adopted a decade later that 
stressed a public health-based “harm reduction” agenda for illicit drugs). 
 96. See supra note 53 (providing a definition of the moral content of criminal law). 
 97. Professor Coffee’s scholarship is particularly enlightening on the blurred distinction 
between civil violations and punishable crimes. Coffee, Reflections, supra note 49; Coffee, 
Paradigms Lost, supra note 49. 
 98. KADISH, supra note 58, at 49-53; see also Green, supra note 53, at 1556-69 
(analyzing how the concept of “moral neutrality” applies to different types of criminal 
activity, including strict liability and public welfare crimes, minor violations, and economic 
and regulatory crimes). 
 99. Examples include dubious traffic violations that are enforced solely to collect the 
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The greatest boon for law enforcement from overcriminalization is not 
purely financial, however, but rather professional and structural: increasing 
an officer’s power and thus the potential for career advancement.  Although 
law enforcers are generally charged to “do justice,” they are not neutral and 
detached entities within the legal system, wholly indifferent to outcomes in 
particular cases or net results over time.  Like all other professionals, police 
and prosecutors seek the personal esteem and promotion that accompany 
success, typically measured by the number of arrests for the former and 
convictions for the latter.100  To put it bluntly, beat cops do not become 
homicide detectives by helping little old ladies across the street, and district 
attorneys are not reelected for dismissing cases or shrugging off acquittals.  
As Professor Stuntz has forcefully argued, the more crimes on the books, 
the more behavior that is restricted (and restricted in more ways), and the 
more punishment for a particular offense, the more clout police and 
prosecutors can exercise in the criminal justice system.101  By eliminating a 
hard-to-prove element or by making the offense one of strict liability, 
crimes become easier to establish at trial. And by raising the potential 
punishment—which can be done by, among other things, increasing the 
attached penalties, enacting an anti-recidivist statute, or charging a single 
course of conduct as multiple crimes (i.e., “charge stacking”)—defendants 
are provided a strong disincentive to press their luck in court.  All of this 
boosts the authority of police and prosecutors, allowing them to wield a 
bigger stick throughout the criminal process, and often leaves the accused 
little choice but to accept a plea bargain, which leads to more and cheaper 
convictions and, therefore, happier law enforcement officials.  And when 
law enforcers are happier, so are lawmakers.102 
The one government body that could check political excesses and curb 
the overcriminalization phenomenon, the American judiciary, has largely 
                                                          
underlying fine or to search automobiles for contraband, as well as bogus regulatory and 
corporate crimes that are used as leverage to obtain large monetary settlements.  See, e.g., 
Harris, supra note 27, at 561-63 (noting that in Volusia, Florida, “deputies aimed not only to 
make arrests, but to make seizures of cash and vehicles, which their agency would keep,” 
with African Americans and Hispanics constituting more than seventy percent of all drivers 
stopped along a stretch of I-95). 
 100. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 519 (2001) (stating that police organizations, like bureaucracies, 
tend to measure success quantitatively—by the number of citations issued, arrests made, and 
crimes solved—as opposed to more qualitative assessments); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. 
Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll:  Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations is the Solution to 
Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 347 n.46 (2003) 
(mentioning that conviction percentages are a large part of election or promotion in state and 
federal attorney’s offices) (quoting REP. OF THE ILL. SENATE MINORITY LEADER’S TASK 
FORCE ON THE CRIM. JUST. SYS. 20 (2000)). 
 101. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 519-20, 531; Stuntz, Civil-Criminal 
Line, supra note 49, at 14-15. 
 102. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 510, 528 (describing the natural 
alliance between legislators and prosecutors that contributes to overcriminalization). 
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failed to do so.  The legal restrictions imposed on the power to criminalize 
and punish are far and few between, with the only vigorous substantive 
boundaries set in areas like speech and reproductive freedom.  In contrast, 
more apt and generally applicable limitations—such as judicially imposed 
mens rea and actual notice requirements, barriers against shifting 
evidentiary burdens to the defense, and bans on status offenses and severe 
punishments—have become “derelict[s] on the waters of the law.”103  For a 
variety of reasons, including the anxiety of appearing to be a Lochner-
esque super-legislature, the courts have been hesitant to limit the political 
branches in their enactment and enforcement of substantive crimes and 
punishments.104  It has even been argued that by strictly regulating the 
process of investigation and prosecution—often called the “criminal 
procedure revolution” in the law of search and seizure, confession, and 
legal representation—the judiciary has inadvertently encouraged politicians 
to overcriminalize.105  While the Fourth Amendment generally requires that 
police have probable cause to search or arrest for an offense, for instance, 
and the Fifth Amendment restricts custodial interrogation of suspected 
criminals, these provisions have no bearing on what can be a crime in the 
first place.106  As a result, if it proves difficult to uncover a particular 
                                                          
 103. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s imposition of a notice requirement as a deviation from the “strong 
current of precedents”). Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) 
(striking down the crime of being a drug addict), with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 
(1968) (upholding the crime of public intoxication).  Compare also Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (striking down a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole for a recidivist convicted of passing a bad check for $100), with Rummell v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole for a recidivist convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses), and 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to 
life for a recidivist convicted of stealing approximately $150 worth of videotapes), and 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to 
life for a recidivist convicted of stealing three golf clubs). 
 104. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 49, at 5 (noting that serious substantive 
review of ordinary legislation has passed from the scene); see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76 
(holding that governing legal principles give legislatures broad discretion in determining the 
appropriate sentence for a crime); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (noting the Court’s traditional 
deference to legislative policy choices and upholding California’s Three Strikes law as 
being within the boundaries of the Eighth Amendment). 
 105. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (arguing that criminalization reduces the cost of 
criminal procedure doctrines such as the probable cause requirement and the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard and thereby gives the government an incentive to expand the 
scope of criminal law); Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 49, at 7-8 (explaining that 
criminal procedure rules without substantive limits may encourage the government to 
expand the scope of criminal liability). 
 106. See, e.g., supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing investigations and 
arrests for trivial behavior and supporting search-and-seizure jurisprudence).  See Stuntz, 
Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 49, at 13 (observing that constitutional law leaves the 
definition of “crime” to politicians).  Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (suggesting that the 
Constitution does not require adoption of any one particular penological theory and that 
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offense consistent with the Constitution, lawmakers need only pass a 
statute that criminalizes conduct that is related but easier to detect and 
investigate, such as the precursors of the targeted behavior.  Although the 
explanatory value of this claim can be debated, the bottom line remains the 
same:  By and large, the overcriminalization phenomenon has gone 
unchecked by the courts. 
So what are the consequences?  As with the causes of 
overcriminalization, the resulting costs are numerous—but again, let me 
suggest just a few.  Distended penal codes of vast criminal liability have a 
degenerative effect on an adversarial system in which law enforcers are not 
impartial bystanders but instead interested parties aggressively seeking 
arrests and convictions.107  For prosecutors, overcriminalization produces a 
dangerous disparity of power, with, for instance, extreme sentences via 
mandatory minimums applied as leverage to squeeze out information or 
guilty pleas.108  Prosecutorial supremacy through overcriminalization is 
troubling enough when the underlying crime and attached penalties are 
tenuous to begin with.  But it also emasculates the constitutional rights of 
the accused—the presumption of innocence, the right to trial by jury, the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and so on—threatening 
prolonged sentences for those who demand their day in court.  It seems no 
stretch to argue that defendants are literally punished for exercising their 
rights.109  The menace of excessive punishment is most alarming, however, 
when it is used to extract pleas from those with legitimate claims of 
innocence or excuse.110 
As for the police, overcriminalization leads to immense discretion to stop 
motorists or pedestrians through legal pretexts, concealing discriminatory 
                                                          
courts should generally defer to legislatures and their policies). 
 107. Supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 45, at 9-10, 17 (discussing 
prosecutorial use of potentially draconian punishment to extract information or guilty pleas); 
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004) (arguing that federal 
prosecutors are “addicted to plea bargaining to leverage its law enforcement resources to an 
overwhelming conviction rate,” resulting in a system “heavily rigged against the accused 
citizen”). 
 109. See, e.g., Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (arguing that harsh federal punishment has 
“dramatically reduced the use of criminal trials, in part by placing a heavy punitive price on 
those who exercise their right to a jury trial”); United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 
1227, 1232 (D. Utah 2004) (noting that the defendant “faced the choice of accepting 15 
years in prison or insisting on a trial by jury at the risk of a life sentence”). 
 110. See, e.g., C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Causes and Public Policy Issues, 
18 CRIM. JUST. 15, 17 (Spring 2003) (noting that a social psychological experiment showed 
that “innocent ‘defendants’ were more likely to accept plea bargains when they faced a 
number of charges or when the probable severity of punishment was great”); Paul Craig 
Roberts, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, 7 INDEP. REV. 567, 568-73 (Spring 2003) 
(suggesting that coercive plea bargaining leads to wrongful convictions), available at 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_07_4_roberts.pdf. 
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enforcement based on race, class, or ethnicity.111  As David Harris has 
observed, few drivers travel more than three blocks without breaking some 
traffic law,112 thus supplying a pretense for a drawn out detention and 
search.  In fact, the all-encompassing nature of today’s codes appears little 
different from a single statute declaring that law enforcement may pull over 
any car or stop any pedestrian at any time for any reason or, for that matter, 
no reason at all.  More often than not, African Americans and Latinos are 
the subjects of such enforcement through the process of racial profiling or, 
as it is sometimes labeled with derision, “D.W.B.”—“Driving While Black 
(or Brown).”113 
At the level of political theory, broad and opaque discretion is difficult to 
square with notions of democratic legitimacy and produces a sort of secret 
law on the streets that is unrecorded and inaccessible, cannot be publicly 
debated by a fully informed citizenry, and thus prevents elected officials 
from being held accountable for their actions and those of their 
subordinates.114  But it also allows police and prosecutors to externalize the 
costs of enforcement on minorities whose grievances are never aired or, 
even worse, are totally ignored by government.  In this sense, 
overcriminalization authorizes law enforcers to levy a regressive “racial 
tax,”115 an unwritten but very real burden for being poor and of color.  It 
should be no surprise that many in the minority community do not trust 
government agents, regardless of good intentions—and as a consequence, 
both public officials and society at large will pay a significant price for the 
racial effects of overcriminalization:  Mistrusting citizens are less likely to 
assist law enforcement and to obey legal commands, which undermines the 
efforts of police and prosecutors and, paradoxically, renders the law 
counterproductive.116 
                                                          
 111. See Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 766-67 (2002) 
[hereinafter Luna, Drug Exceptionalism] (“Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police 
may stop vehicles for any traffic violation, even if the officer was really just pulling over 
minority motorists in pursuit of illegal drugs.”); Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 49, 
at 11-12 (noting enormous police discretion given that probable cause to make a stop for a 
trivial traffic violation is constitutionally indistinguishable from probable cause that a 
suspect committed a much larger offense). 
 112. Harris, supra note 27, at 557-58. 
 113. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Foreword: The New Face of Racial Profiling, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 905, 907 (mentioning “D.W.B.” phenomenon). 
 114. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1112-17 (2000) 
[hereinafter Luna, Transparent Policing] (analyzing theoretical and practical problems 
associated with law enforcement discretion). 
 115. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 158-60 (1997) (discussing 
prejudiced law enforcement as a form of “racial tax”). 
 116. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 183, 185-87 (2003) [hereinafter Luna, Institutional Design] (arguing that police 
officer misconduct founded on racial prejudice breeds citizen distrust and forms a basis for 
racial solidarity against law enforcement); Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 114, at 
1156 (detailing negative consequences stemming from citizen-law enforcement distrust). 
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Overcriminalization also encourages the misallocation or waste of 
limited resources, especially when the underlying rationale, such as the 
pursuit of vice crime, is deemed trivial or untenable by most political 
theories.  “[O]ne can examine side effects of the effort to enforce morality 
by penal law,” Louis Schwartz suggested some forty years ago.117  “Are 
police forces, prosecution resources, and court time being wastefully 
diverted from the central insecurities of our metropolitan life—robbery, 
burglary, rape, assault, and governmental corruption?”118  Despite the 
intervening decades, the most reasonable response remains the same:  
Rather than squandering public funds on the largely futile policing of 
voluntary transactions between prostitutes and their clientele, for instance, 
law enforcement could be utilizing these resources to track down real sex 
offenders like child molesters and rapists.  The ancillary expenses of 
overcriminalization should be considered as well—not only the more than 
twenty thousand dollars per year119 that is spent to incarcerate each inmate, 
but also the financial, emotional, and social costs when otherwise 
productive individuals are unable to contribute to society, when families 
are left without breadwinners, and when neighborhoods are decimated by 
the loss of entire generations of young men.  Add to the tab yet another 
social cost:  Overcriminalization involving vice (and, in fact, any other 
lucrative industry) has the tendency to breed graft and corruption among 
those who are supposed to enforce, rather than break, the law.120 
Moreover, the billions of dollars sunk into the “war on drugs” could be 
applied to a genuine conflict of profound consequences—the “war on 
terror” and the hunt for violent extremists whose avowed goals include 
mass homicide.  Ironically, the federal government has spent substantial 
time and resources to promote the idea that simple drug offenses finance 
terrorist organizations, attempting to show an unbroken line between 
someone who buys a bag of marijuana and those who seek to destroy the 
United States.121  But apparently the brains behind this campaign have 
                                                          
 117. Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offense and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
669, 671 (1963). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See James J. Stephan, State Prison Expenditures, 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/abstract/spe01.htm. (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (quoting average annual operating costs 
in 2001 as $22,650 per state inmate and $22,632 per federal inmate). 
 120. See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 572-76 (describing the 
perverse effects of criminalizing vice, particularly with respect to prostitution and 
gambling). 
 121. See James Dao, The War on Terrorism Takes Aim at Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2002, § 4, at 5 (quoting drug enforcement administrator’s belief that illegal drug production 
and terrorism are connected); Press Release, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign Links Drugs and Terror:  Drug Czar John 
Walters Issues Call to Action to Keep America’s Youth Drug-Free (Feb. 3, 2002), available 
at http://www.ourdrugfreekids.org/WhiteHouse_News/MediaCampain_Terror.htm (last 
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missed the inherent flaw in their argument:  It is not the drugs, their users, 
or even the dealers but instead the lawmakers and enforcers who have 
made illegal transactions so incredibly profitable by criminalizing drugs 
and drug activity, thus fostering a black market worth tens of billions of 
dollars, all tax-free.  To put it another way, terrorists are not lining their 
pockets from the distribution of alcohol or tobacco, although this certainly 
could happen if government were to (re)criminalize these substances. 
Finally, overcriminalization dilutes the moral force of the criminal 
justice system.  As previously discussed, the term “moral” in this context 
does not mean personal or non-secular morality, but instead refers to the 
philosophical morality embodied in the collective norms of American life 
on the proper use of public stigma, incarceration, and even state-imposed 
death.  The deployment of the criminal sanction for behavior that seems 
harmless or unworthy of public censure tends to weaken the moral force of 
criminal law, perhaps to the verge of insignificance for some members of 
society.  The border of criminality becomes hard to discern as a question of 
deterrence and even harder to justify as a matter of desert.  When the law 
struggles to distinguish between proper and prohibited, the criminal 
sanction cannot achieve its bona fide goals, such as preventing harmful 
behavior or imposing just punishment, and instead appears as nothing more 
than an administrative dictate.  And when the criminal law assumes moral 
neutrality, it loses the very justification for depriving human liberty. 
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
If one accepts the foregoing understanding of overcriminalization, its 
causes, and its consequences, the discussion naturally turns to a search for 
answers:  What is to be done?  How can the phenomenon be contained or 
even reversed?  In recent years, some of the brightest minds working in the 
field of criminal justice have offered a number of potential solutions.  The 
first and most frequently discussed option involves the constitutionalization 
of substantive criminal law, thereby imposing the judiciary as a check on 
the political branches’ insatiable appetite for more crimes and harsher 
punishments.  William Stuntz has considered the implementation or 
revitalization of constitutional principles that would limit the power of 
lawmakers to criminalize and punish as well as cabin the discretionary 
authority of law enforcers.  These doctrines would include:  (1) a 
prerequisite of functional notice when government seeks to prosecute 
trivial offenses; (2) a culpability constraint that requires a minimum mens 
rea for behavior that is not obviously wrongful; (3) a rule of desuetude that 
                                                          
visited Feb. 23, 2005) (describing the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s initiative to 
educate Americans about the link between illicit drug use and terrorism). 
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renders unenforced crimes inoperative; and (4) a judicial power to review 
the charging and sentencing decisions of political actors.122 
Another in-court solution is provided by Claire Finkelstein, who focuses 
on the notion of an offense and the subsequent infringement upon 
individual liberty, pointing to the presumption of innocence and the 
prohibition against double jeopardy as judicially cognizable restrictions on 
crime and punishment.  Government must have a theoretical justification 
for any use of the criminal sanction, and for Finkelstein, the harm principle 
supplies the content for such a theory.123  The most recent suggestion—and 
maybe the most ambitious and challenging—is offered by Markus Dubber. 
He argues for a “fresh start”124 in the area of constitutional criminal law 
based on the transcendental values of human dignity and autonomy, 
requiring a reconceptualization of crime and punishment in the form of 
judicially recognized limiting principles for mens rea, affirmative defenses, 
and sentencing.125  All told, the solutions presented by Professors Dubber, 
Finkelstein, and Stuntz are entirely commendable, which, quite frankly, is 
unsurprising given the authors’ scholarly stature.  But, alas, they all suffer 
from the same pragmatic obstacle:  Without a seismic change in American 
jurisprudence and/or revolution on the bench, these ideas seem unlikely to 
be adopted by the courts. 
An alternative approach involves the non-judicial “depoliticization” of 
substantive criminal law.  Once again, Professor Stuntz delivers useful 
analysis of this option, which envisions the shifting of authority to define 
crimes in the first instance from lawmakers to non-political experts in 
criminal justice.126  Stuntz mentions the success of the Model Penal Code, 
an archetype for reforming substantive criminal law promulgated some 
half-century ago and subsequently implemented in whole or in part by 
jurisdictions across the nation.127  Another example is found in the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, a body of scholars and jurists who crafted the 
current punishment scheme in federal courts, the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.128  But Professor Stuntz is quick to note the drawbacks with 
                                                          
 122. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 579-82, 587-98 (outlining 
possible solutions to the problem of overcriminalization); Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra 
note 49, at 31-38 (detailing a minimum mens rea requirement and the rule of desuetude as 
potential constitutional limits). 
 123. See Finkelstein, supra note 60, at 358-93 (detailing constitutional theory pursuant to 
the notion of harm). 
 124. Dubber, supra note 58, at 529. 
 125. See id. at 530-70 (describing constitutional theory premised on human dignity and 
autonomy). 
 126. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 582-87 (discussing means to 
depoliticize criminal law). 
 127. See id. at 583 (explaining appeal of the Model Penal Code project to law reformers). 
 128. See Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 45, at 4-5 (briefly describing genesis of 
federal sentencing reform). 
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both instances of non-judicial depoliticization:  The achievements of the 
Model Penal Code occurred during a relatively short and historically 
exceptional period, when reform efforts were politically welcome and 
eventually embraced by lawmakers.129  “Certainly there is no sign in 
legislative halls of a renewed interest in criminal code revision,” Stuntz 
concludes.130  In turn, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have generated 
intolerable levels of arbitrariness and severity in punishment and thus near 
unanimity “on one point:  The Guidelines have produced bad outcomes.”131  
To me, the injustices of federal sentencing are made all the more troubling 
by the prospect that the Model Penal Code’s many accomplishments 
through depoliticization will be forgotten under the abysmal failures of the 
Guidelines.132 
Against this background, it seems academically perilous to enter the 
fray, at least without some apprehension.  After all, the overcriminalization 
debate has been simmering for generations, and the solutions proffered to 
date have been both highly thoughtful and highly unlikely to succeed.  
Nevertheless, I would like to outline one more possibility.  Rather than a 
judicial curative or some other approach that takes the issue out of the 
hands of lawmakers and law enforcers, my “solution” (in the loosest sense 
of the word) suggests an intellectual device to help politicians and their 
constituents confront questions of crime and punishment.  The goal is to 
provide a vision of how officials should act, presumably what they would 
do if they took their jobs seriously and in the absence of the pressures that 
produce the overcriminalization phenomenon.  This proposal is aimed at 
political actors along the lines of Paul Brest’s Conscientious Legislator’s 
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation133 or, more apropos, The Honest 
Politician’s Guide to Crime Control by Norval Morris and Gordon 
Hawkins.134  But unlike these notable works, the following is only a brief, 
preliminary sketch that cannot offer a programmatic solution for 
government officials.  Instead, it recommends a point of departure for those 
intimately involved or concerned with the criminal sanction, a type of 
mental exercise that should be undertaken before another crime or more 
punishment is added to the books.  The relevant premise is libertarianism. 
All too frequently and always unfairly, libertarians are lampooned as 
wild-eyed conspiracy buffs sitting on a cache of weapons, waiting for the 
                                                          
 129. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 584 (asserting that “[a]t most, 
the M.P.C. offered a convenient focal point for reform efforts [and] a means of temporarily 
paring down criminal codes”). 
 130. Id. at 585. 
 131. Id. at 586. 
 132. See Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 45 (offering broad critique of the 
Guidelines). 
 133. 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). 
 134. MORRIS & HAWKINS, supra note 48. 
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coming Armageddon between citizen militia and authoritarian state.  This 
caricature is not only false, but it also attempts to marginalize adherents to 
a theory that is thoughtfully advocated and consistently applied across all 
issues.  For comparison, consider the flip-flops of American political 
liberals and political conservatives on matters of criminal justice: While the 
former group bemoans various morals offenses involving, inter alia, sexual 
activity but promotes nearly every conceivable economic crime, the latter 
group grumbles about overcriminalization of business yet is more than 
willing to regulate what an individual does with his own body.  In contrast, 
libertarians oppose every form of excessive government authority, 
regardless of whether it emanates from liberals or conservatives, 
Republicans or Democrats.  As Robert Weisberg writes, “Libertarians in 
the United States have always nicely confounded our sense of how some 
controversial political issues, like criminal justice, are supposed to align 
with ideological divides.”135  They are, “in a sense, the most ideologically 
consistent of political figures, opposing state social engineering on all 
fronts.”136  Libertarianism does not object to the overcriminalization of 
business out of a Gordon Gekko-style belief that “greed is good”;137 nor 
does libertarianism oppose vice crimes simply because its proponents are 
pot-smoking, prostitute-loving, atheistic homophiles.  Instead, it is a theory 
premised on the belief that all government intrusions into the lives of 
individuals are inherently suspicious and require justification, particularly 
when authorities seek to deprive human liberty.138  And for this reason, 
libertarianism provides the ideal theoretical foil for considering issues of 
crime and punishment, resisting as it does the use of the criminal justice 
system when one political group or the other would yield new powers to 
the state without a fight. 
The overarching libertarian tenet is individualism, that the human being 
is the fundamental unit of analysis.  The typical basis for this claim is non-
consequential and deontological, with the inviolability of individuals 
founded on the inherent dignity of humans as rational agents with self-
awareness, free will, and the ability to devise a life plan.139  Modern 
libertarians often follow the Enlightenment tradition of individualism as a 
categorical imperative, “reflect[ing] the underlying Kantian principle that 
                                                          
 135. Robert Weisberg, Foreword: A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 367, 380-81 (1999). 
 136. Id. 
 137. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 138. See DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM:  A PRIMER 16-19 (1997) (introducing the key 
concepts of libertarianism and the idea that “the burden of explanation should lie with those 
who would take rights away”). 
 139. See id. at 61-64 (emphasizing that rights are not a gift from government but rather 
possessed by virtue of an individual’s humanity and his ability to reason and act 
responsibly). 
LUNA 10/3/2005  1:34 PM 
2005] THE OVERCRIMINALIZATION PHENOMENON 731 
individuals are ends and not merely means,” in Robert Nozick’s phrasing, 
and “they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends 
without their consent.”140  In other words, the fact that a particular action 
may be good for another person or society in general can never serve as 
grounds for denying an individual’s dignity and personal autonomy.  But 
libertarianism can also be theorized from a consequential and, in particular, 
rule-utilitarian perspective, with the inviolability of the individual based 
upon the beneficial consequences that flow from its universal recognition.  
Nineteenth-century libertarian icon John Stuart Mill concluded that “the 
individual is sovereign”141 based on his own rendition of Benthamite 
utilitarianism, while modern luminary Richard Epstein espouses a 
fundamental principle of libertarianism because “the consequences for 
human happiness and productivity” are “so powerful that it should be 
treated as a moral imperative, even though the most powerful justification 
for the rule is empirical, not deductive.”142 
But regardless of whether the inviolability of the individual stems from 
moral obligation or beneficial outcomes, this libertarian imperative 
necessitates certain rights and guiding principles for the interaction among 
individuals and between individuals and government.  As usually described 
in the literature, a right is held by the individual and serves as a constraint 
on the action of all others, whether they are private citizens or 
representatives of the state.143  Rights establish absolute limits on how an 
individual may be treated, and as such, they must be respected at all times 
by other members of society.  For deontological libertarians, rights exist 
prior to the state rather than being established by fictive social contract, and 
just as importantly, they limit the shape and authority that government can 
assume under this contract, with individuals and collectives having an 
affirmative moral duty not to violate the rights of others through their 
actions.  And because human dignity is inherent and draws no exception 
among beings, all individuals must be bearers of equal rights.  In the words 
of David Boaz, “The progressive extension of dignity to more people—to 
women, to people of different religions and different races—is one of the 
great libertarian triumphs of the Western world,”144 and “[t]he kind of 
equality suitable for a free society is equal rights.”145 
Libertarianism and its conception of rights thereby establish fixed 
                                                          
 140. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30-31 (1974) [hereinafter NOZICK, 
ANARCHY]. 
 141. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., 1998). 
 142. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 59 (1995). 
 143. See, e.g., BOAZ, supra note 138, at 16 (describing libertarian conception of 
individual rights). 
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original). 
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boundaries for private and public action.  Of course, a fully developed 
libertarian theory would provide a much longer explication on the meaning 
of human dignity and the inviolability of the individual, as well as a 
detailed account of the specific rights and principles that emanate from this 
understanding.  But let me provide just a brief description of those 
libertarian rights and principles that directly impact the designation of 
crime and punishment and the implementation of a criminal justice system, 
beginning with the idea of self-ownership.  An individual literally owns 
himself—the corporeal entity known as the human body as well as the 
intellect, knowledge, skills, and so forth, constituting the non-corporeal 
self.  He has an absolute right to control the use of his person, to exercise 
this right consistent with the equal rights of others, and to be free from 
someone else using his person without consent.146  As a result, the 
individual is at liberty to do or not do whatever he chooses with his 
physical body and intangible personality so long as it does not infringe 
upon the rights of others.  To many libertarians, the right of self-ownership 
is a corollary of the Kantian categorical imperative and the inviolability of 
the individual:  If fundamental human dignity requires that a person be 
treated as an end in himself and never used as a means to others’ ends, he 
must own himself in the sense of being able to determine his own ends and 
act upon them as a rational agent with free will.147  To hold otherwise—that 
an individual cannot use his body and personality as he sees fit—would 
mean that the entity making and enforcing the relevant proscription, rather 
than the affected person himself, controls and uses the individual to serve 
its own ends (e.g., fulfilling some policy). 
Self-ownership leads to further personal liberties typically described as 
“property rights.”148  As argued by libertarian theorists from Locke to 
Nozick, an individual has the right to the products resulting from self-
ownership, including a right to the fruits of “mixing his labor,”149 
knowledge, skills, and so on, with natural resources.  If people own 
themselves, both their physical bodies and non-corporeal abilities, then 
they must also own the products generated by their bodies and talents.  
These products include familiar notions of property, like buildings and 
                                                          
 146. See MILL, supra note 141, at 14 (arguing that an individual’s autonomy over his 
body and mind are absolute). 
 147. See, e.g., NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 30-31 (declaring that the individual 
is “inviolable” and cannot be sacrificed for other’s ends without consent). 
 148. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 65-67 (illustrating how all rights can be seen as 
property rights and that self-ownership inherently implicates the ownership of property). 
 149. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5, § 27 (Mark Goldie ed., 2000); 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 174; see also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND 
MARKET:  GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 1 (1970) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, POWER] 
(noting that a free society assumes the existence of a property right in one’s person, the 
fruits of one’s labor, and the resources one finds and uses or converts through this labor). 
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commodities—the barn a farmer builds and the crops he grows on his 
homestead—but also myriad forms of intellectual property, such as the 
song a musician composes or the novel an author writes.  Moreover, when 
an individual owns certain property, he must also have the right to use, 
control, and transfer that property consistent with the rights of others.150  If 
something (e.g., an apple) is an individual’s property (e.g., Anne’s), that 
person necessarily has the right to decide the disposition of that property 
(i.e., Anne has the right to eat, sell, or give away her apple).151 
But libertarianism’s interpretation of property rights premised upon self-
ownership extends beyond the crabbed, colloquial understanding of the 
term and encompasses a much broader vision of personal freedom.  As 
Boaz argues in his libertarian primer, “all human rights can be seen as 
property rights, stemming from the one fundamental right of self-
ownership, our ownership of our own bodies.”152 
The right to self-ownership leads immediately to the right to liberty; 
indeed, we may say that “right to life” and “right to liberty” are just two 
ways of expressing the same point.  If people own themselves, and have 
[the right] . . . to take the actions necessary for their survival and 
flourishing, then they must enjoy freedom of thought and action. . . .  
Freedom of the press—including, in modern times, broadcasting, cable, 
electronic mail, and other new forms of communications—is the aspect 
of intellectual freedom that oppressive governments usually target.  And 
when we defend freedom of the press, we are necessarily talking about 
property rights, because ideas are expressed through property—printing 
presses, auditoriums, sound trucks, billboards, radio equipment, 
broadcast frequencies, computer networks, and so on.153 
Boaz applies this analysis to the ever-contentious “right to privacy” first 
articulated by the Supreme Court some four decades ago.154  Instead of 
                                                          
 150. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 66-67 (claiming that the right to self-ownership carries 
with it the right to acquire and exchange property in order to fulfill needs and desires). 
 151. See, e.g., JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 64 (1988) (describing the “out-
and-out” definition of property rights as “‘x is A’s property’ means ‘A has the right to 
determine the disposition of x’”). 
 152. BOAZ, supra note 138, at 68; see also NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 179 n.* 
(“one first needs a theory of property rights before one can apply any supposed right to 
life”); ROTHBARD, POWER, supra note 149, at 238 (“[N]ot only are property rights also 
human rights, but in the profoundest sense there are no rights but property rights. . . The 
‘human’ rights of the person that are defended in the purely free-market society are, in 
effect, each man’s property right in his own being, and from this property right stems his 
right to the material goods that he has produced.”). 
 153. BOAZ, supra note 138, at 65; see generally MILL, supra note 141 (providing 
libertarian argument for freedom of expression based on rule-utilitarianism). 
 154. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a statute 
prohibiting the distribution and use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it 
impinged on the right of privacy in marital relationships). 
LUNA 10/3/2005  1:34 PM 
734 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:703 
pointing to “penumbras, formed by emanations”155 from various 
constitutional provisions, the doctrine would appear more sensible and 
theoretically robust if, for instance, it considered laws against consensual 
homosexual activity to be violations of self-ownership—an individual’s 
right to do as he pleases with his own body.156 
So far, this interpretation of libertarianism offers a theory of self-
ownership and property rights of the individual and precludes violations of 
these rights by public and private actors.  But in what circumstances may 
the state or another citizen justifiably intrude upon someone’s life?  In 
particular, when may non-consensual force be used against an individual?  
For libertarians, the answer is derived from a commitment to taking rights 
seriously and thus ensuring their enforceability:  The use of force is only 
permissible to prevent violations of individual rights or to retaliate against 
such infringements.157  All people have an obligation not to instigate 
aggression against the rights of others, sometimes referred to as the 
nonaggression axiom.158  The prohibition against non-consensual 
belligerent force is a prerequisite of any civilized society, establishing the 
rule that interactions among people must always be premised on the power 
of human reason and free choice rather than the product of fear or fraud.  
But when a person imposes his will on another and violates that 
individual’s rights, the aggrieved victim or the government in his stead may 
respond in kind.159 
This permissible preventative or retaliatory action, however, must be 
proportionate to the violation of the right, more or less, reestablishing the 
status quo of rights prior to the infringement.160  If Alex snatches Anne’s 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 484. 
 156. BOAZ, supra note 138, at 69-70; see also NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 58 
(taking the position that an individual may choose or permit another to do anything to 
himself). 
 157. See, e.g., John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE 
CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 191 (Randy E. Barnett & 
John Hagel III eds., 1977) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL]: 
Libertarians consider it immoral for any individual to interfere forcibly in the life 
of another unless that other person has first forcibly imposed his will on someone. 
When that happens, the victim is entitled to respond according to the rule. . . that 
the aggressor himself has implicitly laid down. . .   [Likewise, there] is nothing 
contrary to libertarian doctrine in an act of self-defense. 
 158. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 74-75 (describing this axiom). 
 159. See MILL, supra note 141, at 13-14 (discussing the “harm principle,” which 
provides that the prevention of harm to others is the sole justification for state interference 
with personal liberty). 
 160. The idea of proportionality in punishment is typically associated with retributivism, 
although it can also be based on utilitarian theory. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 49-55 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing retributive and utilitarian 
conceptions of proportionality).  Most importantly for present purposes, however, libertarian 
scholarship has espoused proportionality as a limiting principle.  See, e.g., Murray N. 
Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 157, at 
259-70 [hereinafter Rothbard, Punishment]; NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 62-63 
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apple without her consent, Alex has violated her property rights, and either 
Anne or the state can take back the apple by force, if necessary, as well as 
engage in requisite actions to restore the equal rights of all.  But neither 
Anne nor the state should confiscate Alex’s fifty-acre apple orchard or, 
worse yet, cut out his Adam’s apple.  Although we can debate the 
appropriate amount of commensurate force in this context—especially if 
Alex has already eaten Anne’s apple, which happened to be uniquely 
delicious—the intrusion on Alex’s property rights in his orchard and self-
ownership of his throat would seem, under virtually any moral hierarchy, 
grossly disproportionate to the right violated by pilfering a piece of fruit. 
Libertarians forward additional principles that stem from their theory of 
justice, a number of which appear relevant for issues of crime and 
punishment: 
• Personal rights of property require free markets in order to be 
meaningful, allowing individuals to exercise these rights by engaging 
in voluntary exchanges of goods and services through mutual 
agreement.161  Libertarians extol the virtues of production and 
transaction—the social as well as individual benefits of allowing 
private citizens to use their talents and profit through consensual 
dealings—as best exemplified by the enormous socio-economic strides 
made in the Western world through free trade among free nations and 
free citizens.  These benefits were achieved not by centralized 
decision-making but through the spontaneous order of innumerable 
individuals voluntarily coordinating their actions.  As a general rule, 
then, government should not “forbid capitalist acts between consenting 
adults.”162 
• Throughout history, however, state authority has tended to expand as 
far as possible, often at the hands of despots.  Because the justification 
for invading individual liberty is quite limited, libertarians adamantly 
support the idea of limited government.163  For the American brand of 
libertarianism, this has meant:  (1) the separation of powers among 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, arranging 
each as an institutional check on the others and thereby assuring that 
no single body could oppress the people through the concentration of 
authority; (2) the division of power between local and national 
governments, both setting the two levels of governance as checks 
against each other and guaranteeing a degree of local rule responsive 
                                                          
(discussing a rule of proportionality). 
 161. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 17-18 (noting libertarian argument for free markets). 
 162. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 163. 
 163. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 17 (“[l]imited government is the basic political 
implication of libertarianism”). 
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to individual and community concerns; and (3) the constitutional 
enumeration of the powers vested in national government, thus 
denying federal authorities a general police power and limiting their 
jurisdiction to only those issues of nationwide importance.164 
• To the extent that government acts within its authority and does not 
violate the rights of individuals, official commands must comport with 
the rule of law.165  This much-debated ideal166 requires, at a minimum, 
that any law:  (1) should be expressed in general terms; (2) should be 
available to affected parties; (3) should be prospective rather than 
retroactive; (4) should be clear and understandable; (5) should not 
produce contradictory commands; (6) should not require the 
impossible; (7) should not frequently change; and (8) should be 
congruent with its enforcement.167  By requiring unambiguous terms 
for all laws as well as consistency in their enforcement, the rule of law 
also limits the discretion of authorities and the potential for arbitrary or 
prejudicial state action, thus ensuring the libertarian demand for equal 
rights among all individuals.168 
                                                          
 164. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (dividing powers among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of the federal government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating specific 
powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 37-38 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2003) (claiming that the best form of 
republican government includes, inter alia, the “regular distribution of power into distinct 
departments” and “the introduction of legislative balances and checks”); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (suggesting that the delegation of national and international 
issues to the federal government and local issues to the state governments produces a class 
of representatives that are acquainted with and responsive to both sets of issues); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 80-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (proposing that the regulation of 
“[c]ommerce, finance, negotiation, and war” should lie with the federal government and that 
the “administration of private justice between the citizens of the same state, the supervision 
of agriculture, and [similar concerns]” should lie with the state and local governments); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 177-78, 185 (1960) (recounting how 
the preference for limited government played a major role in the development of the 
Constitution and explaining that the Framers sought to create a structure that assigned 
specific powers to different parts of government and limited the overall power of any one of 
those parts). 
 165. See BOAZ, supra note 138, at 17 (providing libertarian argument for the rule of law). 
 166. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997) (commenting that the meaning of the rule of 
law has always been contested and is “less clear today than ever before”). 
 167. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1969) (listing these criteria for 
lawmaking and arguing that a failure to follow them “results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all”); see also Fallon, supra note 166, at 8-9 n.27 
(providing five similar elements for the rule of law and noting that they are consistent with 
Fuller’s criteria). 
 168. See generally Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good 
Governance, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 583-95 (2004) (providing a 
detailed discussion of the rule of law). 
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• Finally, libertarianism is a theory of peace.169  This does not mean 
pacifism, a turning of the other check when an individual or a nation is 
threatened.  Free people will always exercise self-defense to protect 
their rights.  But libertarians understand that warfare has brought 
“death and destruction on a grand scale, disrupted family and 
economic life, and put more power in the hands of the ruling class,” 
Boaz observes, “which might explain why the rulers did not always 
share the popular sentiment for peace.”170  To the greatest extent 
possible, libertarianism seeks peaceful solutions respectful of 
individual rights rather than needless pain and suffering. 
IV. THE LIBERTARIAN PREMISE 
To be sure, the above description of libertarianism has glossed over 
important nuances and belied the differences among distinct versions of 
libertarian theory.  It also has failed to address significant critiques, such as 
controversies over the initial acquisition of property and the distribution of 
natural resources, potential theoretical problems on issues ranging from 
taxation to suicide, and claims that libertarianism is merely anarchism in 
disguise.  Although libertarians have compelling responses to each 
criticism, this article is not the place to hash out the iterative, almost ad 
nauseam arguments and counterarguments.  And while the theoretical 
variations prove fascinating—deontological versus utilitarian, for instance, 
and left-libertarianism versus right-libertarianism—the distinctions are not 
relevant for present purposes.  Instead, the foregoing discussion has simply 
provided a rough sketch of libertarian theory that allows us to reflect on its 
implications for criminal justice and its potential as an intellectual tool to 
rein in the overcriminalization phenomenon. 
Libertarianism envisions a criminal justice system established for one 
singular purpose:  to protect the rights of individuals.  An appropriate 
definition of crime, Randy Barnett and John Hagel suggest, “focuses on the 
violation of rights and, in particular, the fundamental right of all individuals 
to be free in their person and property from the initiated use of force by 
others.”171  Although libertarian theory permits victims to respond to 
infringements of their rights as well as to take steps in self-defense against 
threatened violations, it usually is assumed that individuals prefer to entrust 
these defensive and responsive activities to the state, thus providing the 
rationale for a system of criminal justice manned by police, prosecutors, 
                                                          
 169. BOAZ, supra note 138, at 18. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, Assessing the Criminal:  Restitution, 
Retribution, and the Legal Process, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 157, at 11; see 
id. (“If this right is violated, an imbalance is created between the offending party and the 
victim.”). 
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and judges.172  But the authority of state actors is necessarily limited by the 
rationale for a criminal justice system at the outset—to protect and 
vindicate the rights of individuals.  The very notion of a “victimless” crime 
is a non sequitur for libertarians, as there can be no actionable offense 
without a violation of an individual’s rights.  The fact that a crime has some 
untoward effect on others or society as a whole does not create a new 
“right” enforceable by third parties or the state.  Only specific, direct 
violations of an individual’s self-ownership and property rights may justify 
the use of non-consensual force against an aggressor.173 
For libertarians, the result is a system of criminal justice with strictly 
circumscribed powers.  Along these lines, Nozick famously posits a 
“minimal” or “night-watchman” state, “limited to the narrow functions of 
protection against force, theft, fraud,” and similar acts.174  “[A] more 
extensive state,” Nozick argues, “will violate persons’ rights not to be 
forced to do certain things” and thus “is unjustified.”175  Moreover, 
whatever actions are taken by government officials must be jurisdictionally 
authorized, proportionate to the underlying threatened aggression or 
violation of individual rights, and respectful of the liberties held by those 
on the receiving end of non-consensual force.  The state must recognize the 
constitutional provisions that limit its ability to investigate and prosecute 
crime, including the rights of a suspect or accused individual—who may, in 
fact, be totally innocent of any criminal conduct and is presumed as such as 
a matter of law.  Investigative techniques, like police searches and custodial 
interrogations, must not only comply with procedural requirements of the 
Constitution but must also be commensurate to the alleged wrongdoing that 
justifies state intervention at the start.  Likewise, any punishment imposed 
on a convicted criminal must be proportionate to his violation of the 
victim’s rights, given that an offender is also a bearer of rights and has only 
forfeited them to the extent that he has infringed upon the liberty of 
others.176  The national government faces additional constraints, as it must 
                                                          
 172. See, e.g., Rothbard, Punishment, supra note 160, at 264-65 (discussing the “almost 
universal inclination” to utilize a legal system rather than one of private justice).  But see 
ROTHBARD, POWER, supra note 149, at 1-9 (providing argument for a free market of 
defensive force). 
 173. See Barnett & Hagel, supra note 171, at 15 (theorizing that an action should be 
defined as criminal only if it violates the individual rights of identifiable persons). 
 174. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at ix. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Barnett & Hagel, supra note 171, at 13 (reasoning that a criminal has a 
right to be punished only to the extent of his transgression); ROBERT NOZICK, 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363 (1981) (arguing that the punishment imposed on a 
criminal for a wrongful act should be the product of the magnitude of the act’s wrongfulness 
and the criminal’s degree of responsibility); NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 62-63 
(making similar argument). 
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comply with the limits imposed by the charter of its existence.177  Federal 
lawmakers have “no general right to punish murder committed within any 
of the states,” Chief Justice John Marshall once explained, and “cannot 
punish felonies generally.”178  As a final point, libertarianism’s aversion to 
warfare in the traditional sense carries over to domestic statutes and 
policies pursued with a militaristic mentality and intensity in execution.  
Under libertarian theory, for instance, any demagogic declaration of a “war 
on crime” would be inherently suspicious, and a war-like zealotry in law 
enforcement would be virtually indefensible. 
So how might the preceding interpretation of libertarianism and its 
implications for criminal justice help stem the tide of overcriminalization in 
the United States?  The idea would be for government officials to begin 
their consideration of a particular action—such as a proposed law or an 
occasion for enforcement—from the perspective of libertarianism, 
examining whether the action in question is consistent with self-ownership, 
equal rights of individuals, limited government, and other relevant 
principles.  This libertarian premise would provide a starting place for 
discussion and induce political actors to explain their decisions against the 
background of a theory that, more than any other, strictly constrains the 
powers of government.  It advances a presumption in favor of individual 
liberty and against state action, a mental exercise of sorts that presses for 
justification when a proposal would be deemed unjustifiable by 
libertarianism.  Officials may disagree with the premise, of course, but at 
least they will do so by reference to (presumably acceptable) alternative 
political theories and announced justifications for their actions.179 
The so-called Sensenbrenner Bill,180 currently pending in the House of 
                                                          
 177. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (asserting that the 
Constitution defines and limits the power of Congress, that these limits must be respected, 
and that congressional action exceeding these limits is unconstitutional); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (noting that the enumeration of federal 
powers is “acknowledged by all”). 
 178. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426, 428 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.); see 
also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system, the 
States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law . . . . When 
Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a 
change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 179. As such, the libertarian premise indirectly supports previous arguments for 
transparency in criminal policy-making through publicly deliberated and theoretically 
justified decisions.  Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 12, at 562-89; Luna, 
Institutional Design, supra note 114, at 202-08; Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 
114, at 1163-67. 
 180. Defending America’s Most Vulnerable:  Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005).  It should be noted that the 
Sensenbrenner Bill was being considered by the House Judiciary Committee just as this 
article was going to press—and if the proposed legislation passes, of course, there may be 
substantial changes in its ultimate form. 
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Representatives, provides a useful example.  Among other things, this 
proposal would impose a mandatory minimum sentence of five years 
imprisonment (and a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a second 
conviction) for distribution, attempted distribution, or conspiracy to 
distribute an illegal drug within one thousand feet of a school, college, 
university, playground, public housing facility, youth center, public 
swimming pool, video arcade, public library, daycare facility, or any 
hospital or clinic that provides drug treatment.181  From the libertarian 
premise, the Bill’s problems seem patent:  The criminalization of voluntary 
exchanges for desired goods by consenting adults infringes on individual 
self-determination, property rights, and the principle of free markets. 
Certainly, a state might punish an individual for driving under the influence 
of drugs, due to the very real threat to other people’s lives and property 
from an intoxicated motorist.  It might also make it a crime to sell drugs to 
minors, based on the belief that children lack the ability to consent to such 
transactions.  But the Sensenbrenner Bill prohibits, in Nozick’s words, 
“capitalist acts between consenting adults,”182 an idea that is totally 
anathema to libertarianism. 
Moreover, this proposal would take the unprecedented measure of 
making any drug activity in almost any populated area subject to a federal 
sentence of at least five years imprisonment.183  With its elongated list of 
predicate locations, extended further by a radius of more than three football 
                                                          
 181. Id. §§ 2(c), 2(d), 4.  Among other things, the Bill would also impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment for the distribution, attempted distribution, or 
conspiracy to distribute any illegal drug (including anything greater than five grams of 
marijuana) by someone over the age of twenty-one to an individual under the age of 
eighteen, id. § 2(a); make a second conviction for underage drug distribution or a first such 
conviction by someone with a prior felony drug conviction (state or federal) punishable by 
life imprisonment, id. § 2(b); demand a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years 
imprisonment for any parent committing a drug trafficking offense in or near the presence of 
their minor child, id. § 2(k); require a three-year mandatory minimum sentence for parents 
who witness or learn about drug trafficking near the presence of their minor child but who 
fail to report the offense to law enforcement within twenty-four hours and do not provide 
full assistance in the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of the offender, id. § 
2(m); reduce “safety valve” relief from mandatory minimum sentences for first-time drug 
offenders, id. §§ 2(n)(1), 3, 6; and purge much of the post-Booker judicial discretion in 
sentencing.  Id. § 2. For a detailed analysis of the Bill, see Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums, Summary of HR 1528 “Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to 
Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005, available at 
http://www.famm.org/pdfs/Sensenbrenner%20Bill%202005%20Summary%20LATEST.pdf
. 
 182. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 163. 
 183. In his congressional testimony on a prior version of the Sensenbrenner Bill, 
Professor Frank Bowman argued that the effect of the proposed legislation would be “to 
impose five-year minimum mandatory sentences on virtually any drug offense committed 
anywhere in an urban area.” Hearings on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (statement of Prof. Frank O. Bowman III), available at http://judiciary.house. 
gov/ media/pdfs/bowman070604.pdf. 
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fields, the Bill’s practical effect is to create a new jurisdictional bubble over 
every American city. Anyone who distributes (or conspires or attempts to 
distribute) a doobie almost anywhere in Manhattan commits a federal crime 
punishable by no less than a half-decade in prison.  Apparently, only drug 
activity occurring in, for instance, midwestern cornfields or southwestern 
deserts would avoid the wrath of federal law.  Such legislation is contrary 
to the principles of limited government and narrow congressional powers, 
looking instead like the usurpation of a de facto police power by federal 
lawmakers.  And because of the potentially smothering effect of national 
legislation, the Bill could largely preempt local solutions to local drug 
problems in disregard of the uniquely American wisdom of libertarian-style 
“federalism.”184 
The jurisdictional breadth of the Sensenbrenner Bill is also likely to 
produce disturbing consequences in its execution.  The sheer quantity of 
drug transactions and consumption in the United States as well as the limits 
of federal resources185 would make it impossible for the law to be enforced 
to the hilt or even with some semblance of uniformity.  As a result, federal 
agents and prosecutors would be afforded a tremendous amount of 
discretion in the application of the Bill’s provisions.  Such a  possibility is 
not only inconsistent with the libertarian emphasis on rule of law values, 
but given the practical reality of drug enforcement on the streets and in 
courtrooms, it may also contravene libertarianism’s requirement of equal 
rights.  African Americans account for approximately one-third of all drug-
related arrests nationwide and one-half of state court convictions and 
federal prison sentences for drug offenses—despite the fact that blacks 
constitute little more than ten percent of the country’s population and a 
similar proportion of all drug users.186  The Sensenbrenner Bill may be race 
                                                          
 184. Cf. supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining that American federalism 
contemplates a division of power between federal and state governments and anticipates that 
states and localities will respond to individual and community concerns). 
 185. Cf. Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, supra note 111, at 769-71 (discussing the 
widespread use of drugs in the United States and the expenditure of government resources). 
 186. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
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http://www.census.gov/ popest/archives/2000s/ 
vintage_2002/NA-EST2002-ASRO-02.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (indicating that the 
United States population was 288,368,698 as of July 1, 2002, and that blacks represented 
36,746,012, or 12.7 %, of that figure). 
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neutral on its face, but minority citizens would surely bear the bulk of its 
burdens. 
Finally, libertarianism could not tolerate the severe punishments required 
under the proposal.  As mentioned above, the voluntary decision to engage 
in transactions for drugs is beyond the legitimate powers of government, at 
least to the libertarian.  But regardless of one’s theoretical disposition, it 
seems utterly mind-boggling that an individual who passes a joint to a 
friend might be subject to a mandatory five-year federal prison sentence.  
Even if an infringement of a “right” were assumed, the punishment would 
be grossly disproportionate to the violation.  In the federal system, the 
average sentence is little more than a year of imprisonment for larceny, less 
than two years for burglary or fraud, and slightly more than three years for 
assault or manslaughter.187  As such, an individual convicted under the 
Sensenbrenner Bill—regardless of the drug and amount distributed—would 
spend more time in federal prison than someone who burglarizes a home, 
assaults an innocent victim, or even takes the life of another. It is difficult 
to conceive of any moral scale, let alone one based on libertarian theory, 
that would permit this ugly disparity.  Proponents of such punishment 
might rationalize it as part of America’s ongoing drug war and argue that, 
as with all wars, extreme measures may be required.  Libertarians, of 
course, would find this excuse preposterous, given that the “war” itself is 
unjustified in its inception and, worse yet, is waged by the government 
against its own people.  Moreover, the costs are staggering:  more than ten 
billion dollars spent on drug enforcement per year by the federal 
government alone; more than 1.5 million Americans arrested for drugs each 
year; and more than 300,000 inmates and half of all federal prisoners 
serving time for drug crime.188  These types of consequences provide the 
precise reason why libertarians always endeavor against war-like behavior. 
Stepping back for a moment, it must be admitted that asking government 
officials to evaluate their actions based on the libertarian premise may have 
no better chance of success than any other solution offered to date.  But the 
hope is that a non-court imposed solution would be more palatable to 
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lawmakers and law enforcers, appealing to their mental faculties rather than 
judicially curtailing their authority.  The power of persuasive reasoning can 
be quite strong, and libertarianism happens to be “inspiring as well as 
right.”189  And as confirmed by the sponsors of this symposium—the 
Heritage Foundation190 and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers191—a seemingly peculiar but nonetheless potent coalition of 
interests may be forming to apply reasoned arguments and political 
influence to curb government excesses in criminal justice.  If nothing else, 
the libertarian premise offers one potential tool for these efforts. 
But regardless of whether one accepts my interpretation of libertarianism 
as a theory and potential intellectual device for public and private actors, 
there is now a growing consensus that the overcriminalization phenomenon 
does, in fact, exist and should be confronted sooner rather than later, as 
demonstrated by the topic of this law review issue and the passionate yet 
thoughtful responses of the contributors.  Needless to say, it is becoming 
more difficult for the various political and ideological camps to ignore the 
ever-expanding reach of the criminal sanction and the ever-increasing 
authority of law enforcement.  American society may be fast approaching a 
watershed point—what one recent book aptly (sub)titles “the 
criminalization of almost everything”192—making the call of this 
symposium all the more urgent. 
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